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INTRODUCTION 
In a previous article, we examined recent attempts to 
transmute the traditional tort of public nuisance from its 
traditional elements into an expansive remedy that subsumes 
the law of product liability.1  Only a few months after that article 
was published, the Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the 
expansive use of public nuisance as a substitute for traditional 
product liability litigation regarding lead-based paints.2  In so 
holding, Rhode Island joined other state high courts that 
previously reached the same conclusion.3  Of the original public 
nuisance claims filed in the massive controversy regarding lead 
paints, only those in California remain pending—and they face 
an exacting review under a jurisprudence with unique history 
and traditions. 
Public nuisance, therefore, is at a “crossroads” in California.  
The California lead paint litigation may be the end—or a new 
beginning—of mass tort proceedings against product 
manufacturers based upon public nuisance, as opposed to 
traditional strict product liability.  The controversy lies squarely 
at the intersection of statutory and common law—an interchange 
that has grown increasingly more complex since California’s laws 
were codified in 1850, and since public nuisance was codified as a 
tort in 1872.  The dispute is framed by this singular legal history 
and the complex jurisprudence the state has developed to 
simultaneously empower and restrain the creativity of common 
law courts in such cases.  As a result, those historical 
perspectives and contexts must be appreciated and studied before 
honest prognostications can be made. 
 
 1 Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Alchemy in the Courtroom?  The Transmutation 
of Public Nuisance Litigation, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 941 (2007). 
 2 State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 456 (R.I. 2008). 
 3 See, e.g., In re Lead Paint Litigation, 924 A.2d 484, 494 (N.J. 2007) (recognizing 
that if it were to “permit these complaints to proceed, [it] would stretch the concept of 
public nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely unbounded 
tort antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical limitations of the tort of public 
nuisance”); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 112–13 (Mo. 
2007). 
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The California litigation represents the resurgence—or the 
ebbing—of a tide of public nuisance litigation that has swept the 
nation over the past decades.  In those years, private citizens, 
cities, counties, states, and other public authorities have 
increasingly asked courts—as opposed to the Legislature—to 
solve large societal problems by characterizing problems as 
“public nuisances.”  In the 1970s, lawyers began the movement to 
breathe life into the ancient tort as a tool to resolve problems, 
which adversely affected large numbers of people, as opposed to 
distinct individuals.4  Specifically, they invoked public nuisance 
to sue manufacturers for making and selling products allegedly 
responsible for creating public health and safety problems.  Their 
first—and unsuccessful—attempts were filed against 
manufacturers of products that caused air pollution5 and 
manufacturers of asbestos products.6  Their efforts finally gained 
momentum during the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s, where 
it was asserted that public nuisance claims played a role in 
forcing the tobacco industry to the settlement table.7 
Since then, state and local governmental authorities have 
increasingly championed public nuisance as a vehicle to pursue 
mass tort suits against manufacturers of products believed to 
cause harm to vast numbers of citizens.8  With each new lawsuit, 
creative attorneys have retooled and refined their legal 
 
 4 Up until the 1970s, the tort of public nuisance was largely consigned to the 
footnotes of casebooks.  Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 954 (noting that public nuisance 
was not even included in the Restatement (First) of Torts when it was published in 1939 
and that it was being replaced by new legislatively created “tools more suited to large-
scale solutions”).  During the late 1960s, however, environmental activists seized upon the 
idea of using public nuisance as a tool to combat pollution and successfully sought to 
expand its applicability through the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id. at 955–56. 
 5 The court dismissed this case after finding that it could not simply abolish air 
pollution as a public nuisance and concluding that this societal problem was best resolved 
through the Legislature. See Diamond v. Gen. Motors Corp., 97 Cal. Rptr. 639, 645 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1971) (noting that they were not dealing with a simple dispute between a person 
breathing the air and a person contaminating it, and acknowledging that the real 
question of how to control air pollution is best left to the state and federal legislatures). 
 6 Governmental authorities claimed that asbestos products, by their very existence, 
were a public nuisance that interfered with the public health “because ‘[t]he stream of 
commerce can carry pollutants every bit as effectively as a stream of water.’” City of San 
Diego v. U.S. Gypsum, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 876, 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Tioga Pub. 
Sch. Dist. #15 v. U.S. Gypsum, 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993)).  After acknowledging 
the breadth of circumstances in which California law permitted recovery in public 
nuisance, the court declined to turn this ancient doctrine into a super tort by holding that 
California law does not allow for “recovery for a defective product under a nuisance cause 
of action.” Id. at 883.  The court went so far as to state that “under City’s theory, nuisance 
‘would become a monster that would devour in one gulp the entire law of tort . . . .’” Id. 
(quoting Tioga Pub. Sch. Dist. #15, 984 F.2d at 921); see also Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, 
at 957–58. 
 7 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 958.  
 8 Id. at 960–61; see also Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the Legislature: State 
Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. REV. 913, 914 (2008). 
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arguments—seeking ways to overcome precedents against 
holding manufacturers of lawful products liable for creating 
public nuisance for simply marketing and selling a product.9  
Over the past decade, public entities in California have 
attempted to use public nuisance as a means to address diverse 
and complex societal problems, such as: 
 urban violence by suing gun manufacturers;10 
 childhood lead poisoning caused by deteriorating paint in 
older housing stock by suing lead pigment manufacturers 
that supplied the lead used in lead paint more than thirty 
years ago;11 and 
 climate change by suing automobile manufacturers and 
energy-related companies whose products emit greenhouse 
gases.12 
Admittedly, most citizens would like to eliminate, or at least 
mitigate, these problems—but that concern does not necessarily 
justify judicial intervention.  To date, the California Supreme 
Court has yet to decide whether public nuisance is an 
appropriate vehicle for governmental authorities to redress 
societal harms allegedly created by product manufacturers,13 
although it is increasingly likely that the court will have the 
opportunity to do so in the lead paint litigation.14 
 
 9 The repackaging of this ancient tort is being done using the same sympathetic 
reasoning that convinced common law courts to develop strict product liability. See 
William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 
YALE L.J. 1099, 1122 (1960) (landmark article advocating the demise of fault-based causes 
of action in favor of strict products liability). 
 10 In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 663 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005); Ileto v. Glock 
Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1194 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 11 Cnty. of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 319 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 12 Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at *5 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 17, 2007).  Although the State voluntarily dismissed its appeal on June 19, 2009, 
Unopposed Motion to Dismiss Appeal at 2, Cal. v. General Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 
MJJ (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007), http://www.globalclimatelaw.com/uploads/file/ 
California%20v%20GM%20dismissal.pdf, the initial pursuit of the action suggests the 
Attorney General’s potential interest in public nuisance as a vehicle to redress 
widespread harms.  See also Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 
863, 868 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal filed, No. 09-17490 (9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2009). 
 13 The court had the opportunity to decide the issue in County of Santa Clara v. 
Atlantic Richfield Co., but elected to forego review, perhaps because the issue was framed 
in the context of a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, as opposed to a complete factual 
record.  In any event, the court’s denial left the matter open for later challenges. Atlantic 
Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 331. 
 14 Recently, the California Supreme Court cleared the way for the lead paint 
litigation to proceed after a lengthy appellate challenge to the propriety of the use of 
contingent fee counsel by public entities to pursue public nuisance cases. Cnty. of Santa 
Clara v. Superior Court, 235 P.3d 21, 41 (Cal. 2010). 
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The attraction of public nuisance as a new remedy is 
superficially understandable, but fundamentally elusive.  
Perhaps private and governmental attorneys believe that public 
nuisance is a uniquely appropriate candidate for “remolding” into 
a “super tort”—appropriate because it is a nebulous, ill-defined, 
“catch all” tort that can be raised in virtually any situation where 
defendants are alleged to have engaged in broadly injurious or 
offensive behavior.  Perhaps they believe that this vagueness 
makes the tort more malleable than traditional product liability 
claims, and hence more adaptable and flexible to meet society’s 
needs.15  Whatever these advocates may surmise, they should not 
presume that California nuisance law is not constrained by 
significant precedents.  Any California Supreme Court decision 
regarding the tort’s utility and applicability certainly will not be 
written on a “blank slate.”  Indeed, public nuisance has a long 
and colorful history in California, and California courts have 
been resolving public nuisance disputes since the early days of 
statehood. 
This Article chronicles the use and development of the tort of 
public nuisance in California, focusing on the types of 
circumstances in which its use was approved.16  It discusses the 
historical foundations of California’s jurisprudence and the 
impact of that history on the construction and application of 
“common law” remedies such as public nuisance.  It reviews the 
nature and elements of public nuisance,17 and then frames and 
substantiates the unique position in which California courts find 
themselves regarding public nuisance, particularly when product 
claims are involved.18  California, the state viewed by many as 
the origin of strict product liability, must now decide whether its 
courts will preside over the dissolution of its principles.  Those 
courts stand as gatekeepers for a new mass tort theory, and they 
must decide whether they will—or will not—admit a transmuted 
cause of action that has been specifically engineered to displace 
long-established rules that govern the liabilities of product 
manufacturers. 
 
 15 The redefining of this malleable tort began after these same counsel endured 
decades of defeat in courts as a result of traditional common law product liability rules. 
See Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 957–59; see also Donald G. Gifford, Public Nuisance as 
a Mass Products Liability Tort, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 745 (2003) [hereinafter Gifford]; 
Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, The Law of Public Nuisance: Maintaining Rational 
Boundaries on a Rational Tort, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 541, 542–43 (2006). 
 16 See infra Part I. 
 17 See infra Part II. 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 185–203. 
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I.  THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC NUISANCE 
The law of public nuisance is ancient, as are the confusion 
and debates regarding its meaning.  The tort can be traced to the 
feudalism of the Middle Ages and was transported to America by 
the earliest English settlers.19  Despite its persistent viability, 
the tort has always been difficult to understand and apply.  
Predictably, when Horace Wood published the first American 
treatise on nuisance in 1875, he described public nuisance as a 
“wilderness of law.”20  Later, William Prosser, reporter for the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, described nuisance law as an 
“impenetrable jungle,” and as a “‘legal garbage can’ full of 
‘vagueness, uncertainty and confusion.’”21 
Some jurists tried to dispel this confusion.  For example, 
United States Supreme Court Justice George Sutherland once 
described a public nuisance as “merely a right thing in the wrong 
place—like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”22  His 
observation is consistent with the legal maxim “sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas,” which means that property is held subject 
to the condition that its use should not injure others or impair 
the public right and interests of the community.23  This principle 
is the foundation of the common law of nuisance,24 and, 
significantly, it was so recognized by California in 1872.  At that 
time, California’s Legislature enshrined it in state law by 
declaring that “[o]ne must so use his own rights as not to infringe 
upon the rights of another.”25  Since then, the California Supreme 
Court has held that the maxim “implies that one may make any 
use which he pleases of his own [property] so long as he does not 
injure others.”26 
 
 19 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 953; Gifford, supra note 15, at 745, 800–01. 
 20 Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 89, 
90 (1998). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
 23 Locklin v. City of Lafayette, 867 P.2d 724, 743 (Cal. 1994); see also Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima the Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 433–34 (1989); 
Vill. of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387; Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 522 (1897). 
 24 LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE SHAW 
246 (1987); CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 324 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1974); Hulbert v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 118 P. 928, 930–31 (Cal. 1911); 
Woodruff v. North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 801 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) 
(stating that this maxim “is one of the fundamental maxims of the common law, more 
frequently cited and enforced, perhaps, than any other in the law”). 
 25 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3514 (Sumner Whitney & Co. 1872). 
 26 Reclamation Dist. No. 833 v. American Farms Co., 285 P. 688, 690 (Cal. 1930) 
(citing Galbreath v. Hopkins, 113 P. 174 (Cal. 1911)); see also People v. Gold Run Ditch & 
Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1159 (Cal. 1884) (“Every business has its laws, and these require of 
those who are engaged in it to so conduct it as that it shall not violate the rights that 
belong to others.  Accompanying the ownership of every species of property is a 
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Despite this maxim, the California Supreme Court has not 
entirely avoided the complications that have plagued the tort for 
centuries.  For example, it described a “public or common 
nuisance . . . [as] a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting 
of an interference with the rights of the community at large.”27  
Moreover, it recently stated that the “doctrine is aimed at the 
protection and redress of community interests and, at least in 
theory, embodies a kind of collective ideal of civil life.”28  
Descriptions such as these, along with the unusually wide 
variety of cases in which judges have applied the law of  
public nuisance, have led scholars to describe this doctrine  
as “notoriously contingent and unsummarizable.”29  
Notwithstanding this bleak observation, and despite a host of 
other articles that have described the development of public 
nuisance,30 it is still useful—indeed necessary—to review its 
history and, for the purposes of this article, examine how 
California’s Legislature has established public nuisance in its 
civil code, and to study how California’s courts have applied this 
ancient tort. 
A. Origins in England 
It is generally agreed that English common law courts 
created the tort of nuisance during the twelfth century.31  
Originally, it was only available to the Crown and was utilized to 
stop people from encroaching on the King’s land or blocking a 
public road or waterway.32  The sheriff prosecuted it as a crime, 
 
corresponding duty to so use it as that it shall not abuse the rights of other recognized 
owners.”) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479, 3514 (West 1997)); Barrett v. S. Pac. Co., 27 P. 
666, 667 (Cal. 1891) (“It is a maxim of the law that one must so use and enjoy his property 
as to interfere with the comfort and safety of others as little as possible consistently with 
its proper use.”).  
 27 People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court 705 P.2d 347, 353 (Cal. 1985). 
 28 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 603 (Cal. 1997). 
 29 Halper, supra note 20, at 90. 
 30 See, e.g., Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 948–51; C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND 
SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT 3–5 (1949); Gifford, supra note 15, 
at 743; Robert Abrams & Val Washington, The Misunderstood Law of Public Nuisance: A 
Comparison with Private Nuisance Twenty Years After Boomer, 54 ALB. L. REV. 359, 361–
62 (1990); Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 15, at 541–42; J.R. Spencer, Public 
Nuisance—A Critical Examination, 48 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 55, 59 (1989); WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 571 (1941); Eric L. Kintner, Note, Bad Apples 
and Smoking Barrels: Private Actions for Public Nuisance Against the Gun Industry, 90 
IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1190–91 (2005). 
 31 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 951 (citing FIFOOT, supra note 30, at 3–5); see also 
Acuna, 929 P.2d at 603 (recognizing that “[t]here are few ‘forms of action’ in the history of 
Anglo-American law with a pedigree older than suits seeking to restrain nuisances”). 
 32 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. a (1979); Faulk & Gray, supra 
note 1, at 951 (citing Abrams & Washington, supra note 30, at 361–62); see also Philip L. 
Judson, Unlawful Agricultural Working Conditions as Nuisance or Unfair Competition, 19 
HASTINGS L.J. 398, 401 (1968) (citing James v. Hayward, (1631) 79 Eng. Rep. 761 (K.B.) 
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and consequently, the tort has always been closely tied to the 
government’s use of its police powers.  The majority of early 
nuisance cases were brought to remedy violations of property 
rights.33  On rare occasions, however, early nuisance cases were 
brought to remedy offensive activities not tied to property (for 
example, “helping a ‘homicidal maniac’ to escape, being a 
common scold, . . . selling rotten meat, [and] embezzling public 
funds”).34  Accordingly, the authority to commence public 
nuisance actions was not derived from a private “tort” concept, 
but rather from what is now known as the sovereign’s “police 
power.”35 
Between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, public nuisance 
remained a “criminal” tort reserved for the King.  Citizens were 
not allowed to bring nuisance claims in their own names to 
recover for harms inflicted by others against them and their 
neighbors.36  This limitation ended in the sixteenth century, after 
a dissenting justice opined that ordinary citizens should be 
allowed to sue and recover damages caused by public nuisances 
in certain situations.37  As a result, private citizens were given 
the right to sue for public nuisance, but only if they could prove 
that they “suffered a ‘particular’ or ‘special’ injury that was not 
common to the public.”38  To be special, the injury had to be 
“different in kind,” not just more severe than that suffered by the 
 
and W. PROSSER, TORTS §§ 87, 89 at 593, 606 (3d ed. 1964)); Acuna, 929 P.2d at 603 
(stating that a public nuisance was originally an offense against the crown).  
 33 People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 474 (Cal. 1941).  Property-related activities 
prosecuted as “public nuisances” included:  digging up a wall of a church, keeping a tiger 
in a pen next to a highway, leaving mutilated corpses on doorsteps, keeping treasure 
troves, and subdividing houses which “become hurtful to the place by overpestering it 
with poor.” Abrams & Washington, supra note 30, at 362. 
 34 Abrams & Washington, supra note 30, at 362. 
 35 Lim, 118 P.2d at 474 (noting that it was “an extremely rare case, and may be 
considered, if it ever happened, as an anomaly, for a court of equity to interfere at all . . . 
to put down a public nuisance which did not violate the rights of property, but only 
contravened the general policy.’”). 
 36 Opponents to a private cause of action for public nuisance argued that, if allowed, 
a defendant would be brought into court multiple times to defend against a single offense. 
Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 952 (citing Gifford, supra note 15, at 800). 
 37 The source of this change is uniformly credited to a dissenting opinion in an 
“anonymous” King’s Bench decision. Id.  In that case, Justice Fitzherbert opined that 
when a person suffers an injury that is different-in-degree (as compared to different-in-
kind) from the general public, then he should be allowed to bring his own public nuisance 
claim. Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the 
Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 792–93 (2001).  For his hypothetical, he used 
the example of a person riding on a public highway at night and coming across a man-
made ditch. Id.  If he is merely delayed or inconvenienced the same as everyone else, then 
he does not have a private public nuisance cause of action. Id.  But, if he and/or his horse 
are physically injured because they fell into the trench, then he should have a personal 
public nuisance cause of action against the person who dug the trench across the public 
road. Id. 
 38 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 952. 
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general public.39  Another important distinction between public 
nuisance actions brought by the Crown and those brought by the 
general public was the remedy available.  Private citizens were 
limited to seeking monetary damages because injunctive relief or 
abatement remedies were solely reserved for the Crown.40  As a 
result, the law of nuisance began to subsume elements of 
criminal law, real property law, and tort law.41 
Gradually, English common law courts allowed persons other 
than the Crown to bring public nuisance actions to address public 
concerns, such as “the right to safely walk along public highways, 
to breathe unpolluted air, to be undisturbed by large gatherings 
of disorderly people and to be free from the spreading of 
infectious diseases.”42  During this period, many public nuisance 
cases involved people blocking highways, encroaching on 
highways, or dumping all sorts of garbage on them.43  They also 
addressed the blockage of waterways and flooding, as well as the 
pollution of streams and ponds used as a source of water for 
people and livestock, and problems created by allowing diseased 
animals to roam.44  Finally, they also dealt with activities not 
directly related to property violations, such as the selling of unfit 
food stuffs, short-selling food or ale, inappropriate hunting 
practices (for example, catching immature game or hunting out of 
season), closing bawdy-houses and disorderly ale-houses, night-
walkers, and eavesdroppers.45  In medieval times, public 
nuisance was used to address conflicts between land use and 
social welfare because it provided judges (who lacked guidance 
from legislative bodies on what society deemed to be 
unreasonable behavior) with a flexible judicial cause of action 
that allowed them wide latitude and discretion to adapt their 
rulings to remedy wrongs.46  It would be another couple of 
hundred years before the extraordinary power held by judges to 
use the common law tort of public nuisance to address some of 
society’s more pressing problems was curtailed, constrained, and 
limited by legislative enactments.47 
 
 39 Id. at 952–53. 
 40 Id. at 950 (citations omitted).  Conversely, governmental authorities are not 
allowed to seek damages for a public nuisance. Id. 
 41 Halper, supra note 20, at 99. 
 42 Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 15, at 543–44. 
 43 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 951. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 951 n.46 (citing Spencer, supra note 30, at 59–60). 
 46 State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 444 (R.I. 2008). 
 47 Edwin S. Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389, 391–92 
(1903) (suggesting that the use of injunctions to enjoin public nuisances lapsed between 
about 1650 and 1800 because a general distrust by the people of English courts existed). 
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B. Entry into American Jurisprudence 
As citizens of English ancestry began colonizing America 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they brought 
with them the English system of justice.  This included the 
common law tort of public nuisance, which was generally adopted 
in Colonial America without change.48  Early American nuisance 
cases typically fell into one of two categories: either dealing with 
people blocking highways or waterways, or stopping perceived 
invasions of public morals.49  Over time, as America expanded 
westward and the industrial revolution took hold, our society 
gradually shifted from agrarian to industrial.50  This change did 
not always come smoothly.  While new inventions brought with 
them efficiency, speed, and opened new horizons, they also 
brought noise, air and water pollution, and many other less 
desirable consequences.51  Given the fact that noxious trades, and 
unsanitary and smelly conditions were historically treated as 
public nuisances in England, it is not surprising that this remedy 
was adopted in America to address similar conditions. 
It should be remembered that before the onset of the 
twentieth century, there was very little state legislation 
regulating or prohibiting pollution or otherwise governing the 
activities of most businesses.  Without such regulations, people 
engaged in business generally were free to run their operations 
and facilities as they pleased, and most health and safety-related 
restrictions were viewed by businessmen as unnecessary and 
unwanted restrictions that put them at a competitive 
disadvantage.  Consequently, the only redress often available to 
citizens and/or governmental authorities was a public nuisance 
lawsuit. 
Increasingly in recent times, however, legislatures, with 
their unique ability to weigh and balance the public interest, 
have sidestepped the need for public nuisance litigation.  They 
have employed their investigative resources and diverse 
deliberative resources to enact a vast tapestry of statutes and 
regulations—provisions that set forth and define minimum 
 
 48 Gifford, supra note 15, at 800. 
 49 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 953 (citing Gifford, supra note 15, at 800–01).  The 
cases involving public morals and welfare involved lotteries and other forms of gambling 
and wagering, keeping a disorderly house or tavern, enabling prostitution, and using 
profane language. Gifford, supra note 15, at 800–01 (citations omitted). 
 50 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 953. 
 51 Id. (citing Halper, supra note 20, at 101) (discussing some notable nuisance cases 
during this period such as: Chenowith v. Hicks, 5 Ind. 224, 224 (1854) (water pollution 
from a slaughterhouse); Commonwealth v. Brown, 54 Mass. 365, 368 (1847) (air 
pollution); Smiths v. McConathy, 11 Mo. 517, 519 (1848) (distillery vapors and hog waste); 
and Luning v. State, 2 Pin. 215, 218–19 (Wis. 1849) (damming a waterway)). 
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societal norms outside of the common law process.52  These new 
laws not only set forth conduct expected from the business 
community and general citizenry, but also outlined 
comprehensive solutions to an extraordinarily wide variety of 
conflicts between land use and social welfare, including but not 
limited to pollution and public health concerns.53  In many of 
these enactments, legislatures even specified the activities and 
behaviors that constituted nuisances.54  These laws limited the 
judiciary’s “common law” discretion because they required judges 
to consider whether, and to what degree, legislatures approved of 
an activity when determining the existence of the nuisance.55  As 
we will see below, this is particularly true in California where 
the Legislature’s role in defining public nuisances is well 
established.56 
C. Historical Roots of Public Nuisance Litigation in California 
i.  Early Days 
California grew from diverse peoples and cultures—and it 
did so perhaps more quickly and violently than any other 
American state.57  Those influences, which profoundly affected 
California’s government and legal systems, persist today in the 
interactions between codified laws and the common law 
process—particularly regarding the law of public nuisance. 
Prior to the Mexican-American War, California was a remote 
northern Spanish province, sparsely populated by a series of 
missions dedicated to spreading Christianity to the local 
natives.58  When the war ended in 1848, Mexico ceded all land 
north of the Rio Grande River to the United States (including 
what is now California) in return for fifteen million dollars.59  
 
 52 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 954. 
 53 Id. at 954–55. 
 54 Id. at 954. 
 55 See infra Part II(C). 
 56 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997).  
 57 See Lewis Grossman, Codification and the California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 
617, 622–25 (1994) (discussing problems with maintaining order and lack of intellectual 
and cultural resources in early days of statehood). 
 58 See CALIFORNIA MISSIONS FOUNDATION, http://www.missionsofcalifornia.org/ 
foundation/index.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2011); CALIFORNIA HISTORY ONLINE, 
http://www.californiahistoricalsociety.org/timeline/chapter4/001.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2011); CALIFORNIA HISTORY ONLINE, MEXICAN CALIFORNIA: THE HEYDAY OF THE 
RANCHOS, http://www.californiahistoricalsociety.org/timeline/chapter5/index.html (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2011). 
 59 The Mexican-American War ended on February 2, 1848 with the signing of the 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.  The treaty was later ratified by the United States Senate. 
The Library of Congress, The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, http://www.loc.gov/rr/ 
hispanic/ghtreaty (last updated Feb. 14, 2011). 
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California then became an official territory of the United States 
with a population estimated between 7300 and 14,000.60  The 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, under which Mexico ceded 
California to the United States, guaranteed the protection of 
property interests vested previously under Mexican law.61 
During this period, California’s only source of governmental 
authority was the American military, which proved wholly 
inadequate after gold was discovered at Sutter’s Mill on the 
American River in 1848.62  Because of the gold rush, California’s 
population jumped to more than 90,000 people by the end of 
1850, and then leaped to more than 300,000 by 1854 as people 
from around the world rushed to California.63  This dramatic 
influx of settlers, coupled with the extreme wealth to be made, 
resulted in violence and ethnic conflicts—as well as hosts of 
disputes regarding mineral interest claims and property 
interests.64  As a result, Congress was urged to establish a 
civilian government.65  Californians held a constitutional 
convention in Monterey in 1849 to draft a constitution 
establishing the state’s government.66  Shortly thereafter, 
Congress agreed to admit California as the thirty-first state on 
September 9, 1850.67  Shortly thereafter, the property interest 
guarantees provided by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo were 
finally implemented by the California Land Act of 1851, which 
provided a commission to resolve private land claims regarding 
titles “derived from the Spanish or Mexican government”68 using, 
 
 60 See California Becomes the 31st State in Record Time, HISTORY.COM, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/california-becomes-the-31st-state-in-record-
time (last visited Oct. 9, 2011); Andrea Franzius, California Gold—Migrating to 
California: Overland, Around the Horn, and via Panama (Nov. 1997), 
http://www.duke.edu/~agf2/history391/migration.html. 
 61 Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, Feb. 2, 
1848, 9 Stat. 22. 
 62 Steve Wiegand, A Zigzag Path Led to Statehood, SACRAMENTO BEE (Jan. 18, 1998), 
http://www.calgoldrush.com/lb_sets/04statehood.html; JANELLE WISE & LARISA SOMSEL, 
STAY EAST YOUNG MAN: CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH LETTER SHEETS, CALIFORNIA HISTORICAL 
SOCIETY 6 (1999), available at http://www.californiahistoricalsociety.org/programs/ 
pdf/stay_east.pdf (describing the Gold Rush, which began on January 24, 1848). 
 63 WISE & SOMSEL, supra note 62, at 7. 
 64 See California History Online, Diversity and Conflict (last visited Oct. 9, 2011), 
http://www.californiahistoricalsociety.org/timeline/chapter6/c001.html (detailing the 
ethnic conflicts that existed during the gold rush).  To deal with this lawlessness, citizens 
sometimes banded together forming vigilance committees to impose justice as they saw 
fit. See WISE & SOMSEL, supra note 62, at 11–12 (describing the activities of California’s 
Committees of Vigilance). 
 65 WANDERINGLIZARD.COM, http://www.inn-california.com/articles/history/ 
californiastatehood.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2011) (discussing the establishment of a 
civilian government). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id.; see also California History Online, supra note 64. 
 68 Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 41, § 8, 9 Stat. 631, 632 (1851). 
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among other authorities, “the laws, usages, and customs of the 
government from which the claim is derived.”69 
ii.  Creating a Legal System 
One of the first issues Californians faced was deciding upon 
a foundation for their legal system.  With its historical ties to 
Mexico, the Civil Code system was familiar to many citizens—but 
others, especially newly arrived citizens who emigrated to the 
United States, were acclimated to English common law 
systems.70  Since there were—and still are—important 
differences between the civil law and common law systems, 
uniformity was essential to ensure personal, property and 
financial stability.71  The civil law relies on codes to establish 
controlling principles, while the common law derives its precepts 
from decisions by judges.72  Another fundamental divide concerns 
the rights to confront witnesses and jury trials, which are 
guaranteed in most common law nations.73  By contrast, juries 
are generally not used in civil law and evidence is regularly 
presented to the court in written statements.74   
After some debate, Californians decided to adopt the English 
common law,75 partially because they believed there was 
insufficient time to create and enact a codified system of laws.76  
Despite this concern, however, California’s first Legislature 
actually codified substantial portions of the common law, 
 
 69 Id. at 633; see also Peter L. Reich, Western Courts and the Privatization of 
Hispanic Mineral Rights Since 1850: An Alchemy of Title, 23 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 57, 65 
(1998). 
 70 See René D. Zentner, Comment, Positive and Natural Law in California, 1846–
1849, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 61–62 (1957). 
 71 The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, THE ROBBINS COLLECTION, 
http://law.berkley.edu/library/robbins/pdf/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
 72 Richard O. Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation?  The Use and Abuse of 
Class Actions in International Dispute Resolution, 10 MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.J. INT’L L. 
205, 212, 222 (2001); MALCOLM EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWSUITS IN NORTHERN NEW 
MEXICO 69 (1994) (comparing and contrasting civil and common law systems). 
 73 EBRIGHT, supra note 72, at 69. 
 74 Id. 
 75 The Mexican system of justice in place in California was superseded by the 
adoption of the common law on April 13, 1850. People ex rel. Vantine v. Senter, 28 Cal. 
502, 505 (1865). 
 76 “The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or inconsistent with 
the Constitution of the United States, or the Constitution or laws of this State, is the rule 
of decision in all the courts of this State.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 22.2 (Deering 2008) (the 
predecessor of this section, section 4468 of the California Political Code, was adopted in 
1850); see also Stiles v. Laird, 5 Cal. 120, 122 (1855) (noting that the “rules of the common 
law were so far adopted in this State as to supply any defect which might exist in the 
statute laws by furnishing additional remedies for the correction of wrongs”); Ralph N. 
Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statutes 1849–1953, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 
766, 766 (1954). 
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creating a framework that, to a greater or lesser extent, appeared 
to constrain judicial creativity with legislative definitions and 
guidance.  Laws were enacted regarding crimes,77 criminal 
procedure,78 civil procedure,79 probate procedure,80 and 
corporations,81 “with the result that substantial portions of the 
law were in effect codified for the time being.”82  The complex 
codes provided detailed standards that were intricately divided 
into parts, titles, and chapters, and consisted of hundreds of 
sections.83  As a result, California’s new “common law” courts 
were not entirely “free” to derive and circumscribe new “common 
law” rights and remedies in all areas of the law; instead, they 
could only do so when the codes were silent.84  Although 
California courts have departed from this rule in certain contexts 
over the years,85 this deferential tradition has persisted in 
California’s jurisprudential history regarding public nuisance.86 
Although the first Legislature’s reasoning is not documented 
thoroughly,87 it is tempting to speculate that the codifications 
reflected a reluctance to entirely abandon the certainty of firm 
legal rules—which characterized the Mexican Civil Code—to the 
discretion of common law courts informed by the principles of 
stare decisis.88  Perhaps because of that reluctance, they rushed 
 
 77 1850 Cal. Stat. 229. 
 78 Id. at 275. 
 79 Id. at 428.  The 1850 procedural statutes “were based almost entirely on the 1848–
1849 FIELD CODES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,” American products 
prepared in New York. See Kleps, supra note 76, at 766 n.4; see also Rosamond Parma, 
The History and the Adoption of the Codes of California, 22 LAW. LIBR. J. 8, 12 (1929). 
 80 1850 Cal. Stat. 377. 
 81 Id. at 332. 
 82 Kleps, supra note 76, at 766. 
 83 Id. at 766 n.4. 
 84 Sesler v. Montgomery, 21 P. 185, 185 (Cal. 1889). 
 85 See generally Izhak Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co.—A Belated and Inglorious 
Centennial of the California Civil Code, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 4 (1977) (analyzing historical 
basis for common law creativity in comparative negligence cases). 
 86 See infra Part II(A). 
 87 See generally Kleps, supra note 76, at 766–67.  The primary document 
substantiating the decision is a report by the California Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary. See CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON CIVIL AND 
COMMON LAW, 1 Cal. 588, 588–604 (1850).  Although Kleps interpreted the report as a 
“stirring defense of the common law system,” Kleps, supra note 76, at 766, another 
authority viewed the report as a “vehement dismissal” of the civil law that evinced an 
intent to create a “cultural barrier.” Susan Scafidi, Native American and Civic Identity in 
Alta California, 75 N.D. L. REV. 423, 439 (1999). 
 88 In view of the need for firm and settled legal principles in the difficult days of 
early statehood, it is not unreasonable to speculate that even those who advocated 
“common law” systems preferred codification.  In that sense, they became de facto 
advocates of statutory primacy—and adopted a “civil law” perspective for the “common 
law” principles they valued.  Indeed, if, as Professor Scafidi opines, the Senate majority’s 
intent was to create “cultural barriers” by rejecting the civil law system, the codification 
of common law rules might be construed as an attempt to ensure the continued 
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to replace the abandoned Civil Code with statutes enshrining 
many common law principles they valued from the United States 
and its territories.  Unlike common law nations,89 civil law 
systems90 generally eschew judicial discretion.  Common law 
legal principles reflect a “preference for pluralism” and the 
“prominence of ‘reasonableness’”—qualities that are largely 
foreign to civil law jurisprudence.91  Unlike the civil law, the 
common law does not always insist on the “right answer”; 
instead, only a reasonable approach is required, defined as an 
approach that accepts that a problem may have “many 
reasonable answers” depending on a controversy’s facts.92  Civil 
law systems, on the other hand, primarily depend upon specific 
statutes, regulations and rules—principles adopted in the 
parliamentary process and enforced by a relatively inflexible 
judiciary.93  Whatever their reasoning, the first Legislature 
decided to give the “common law” a framework that, to a greater 
or lesser extent, appeared to guarantee the applicability of 
certain legal rules, rather than depending on the courts to 
recognize them on a case-by-case basis. 
Although the Mexican Civil Code did not officially survive in 
California, the primacy of codified laws regarding certain issues 
nevertheless persisted after its demise, and led to the creation of 
a “hybrid” system that was neither fully codified nor completely 
“common law.”94  Despite the decision to adopt a common law 
 
prominence of the majority’s traditions. Scafidi, supra note 87, at 439. 
 89 Common law systems exist today in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, Ireland, 
New Zealand, and the United States, and have “substantial influence on the law of many 
nations in Asia and Africa.” JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 4 (1969).  
The traditional date marking the beginning of the common law is 1066 A.D., the year of 
the Norman Conquest. Id. 
 90 The civil law tradition is the dominant legal structure in most of Western Europe, 
all of Central and South America, substantial portions of Asia and Africa, and “a few 
enclaves in the common law world (Louisiana, Quebec, and Puerto Rico).” Id. at 3.  It 
dates back to at least 450 B.C., the approximate date when the XII Tables of Roman Law 
were published. Id. at 2–3. 
 91 George P. Fletcher, Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline, 46 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 683, 699 (1998). 
 92 Id.; see also George C. Christie, Some Key Jurisprudential Issues of the Twenty-
First Century, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 217, 230 (2000). 
 93 MERRYMAN, supra note 89, at 23–24 (noting that, consistent with Roman and 
French legal traditions, written constitutions, specific statutes and decrees, criminal, civil 
and commercial codes, as well as international treaties, generally constitute the exclusive 
sources of law in civil law nations, as opposed to judicial precedents). 
 94 Scafidi, supra note 87, at 440; see also Gordon Morris Bakken, Mexican and 
American Land Policy: A Conflict of Cultures, 75 S. CAL. Q. 237, 237 (1993); Iris H.W. 
Engstrand, The Legal Heritage of Spanish California, 75 S. CAL. Q. 205, 231 (1993); Iris 
H.W. Engstrand, California Ranchos: Their Hispanic Heritage, 67 S. CAL. Q. 281, 281–90 
(1985); Myra Ellen Jenkins, Spanish Land Grants in the Tewa Area, 47 N.M. HIST. REV. 
113 (1972). 
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system, the banishment of the Mexican legal system was “neither 
absolute nor immediate,”95 and “fragments of civil law penetrated 
the 1850 common-law barrier, at least in the area of property 
law.”96  For example, although the Mexican-American War threw 
the Mexican “Alcalde system” of local administration into 
disarray, the system was restored by the American military 
government.97  Wherever a population of Americans assembled, 
an American Alcalde was formed.98  Significantly, the California 
Supreme Court recognized these Alcaldes and melded them into 
the state’s legal system using common law techniques.99  The 
court also applied civil law principles to resolve disputes.100  
Hence, aspects of the civil law persisted “by preference and legal 
necessity for some time after California” adopted a common law 
system.101 
iii.  The Interpretation of California’s Codes 
The first Legislature’s initial codification was quickly 
deemed imperfect.  Less than two years after the first session, 
state officials began calling for “an entire revision” of the code,102 
and the debate raged almost continuously throughout 
California’s first twenty years of statehood.103  During those 
 
 95 See Scafidi, supra note 87, at 439. 
 96 Id. at 428. 
 97 Id. at 440. 
 98 “On every bar, and in every gulch and ravine, where an American crowd was 
collected, there an American Alcalde was elected.” Scafidi, supra note 87, at 440.  The 
American Alcaldes imitated their Hispanic predecessors by resolving disputes informally 
and assigning land grants. Id.  The system was described as “‘inartificial and rude’ but 
‘wonderfully efficient.’” Id. 
 99 See, e.g., Reynolds v. West, 1 Cal. 322, 328 (1850) (affirming land grant as part of 
Alcalde functions); Mena v. LeRoy, 1 Cal. 216, 220 (1850) (recognizing judicial powers of 
Alcaldes). 
 100 See Sunol v. Hepburn, 1 Cal. 254, 255–56 (1850) (applying both Mexican and 
common law to resolve property disputes).  
 101 Scafidi, supra note 87, at 440.  Civil law principles, therefore, continued to 
permeate California law, even though community property rights, as a component of 
marital relationships, were the only element of the civil law expressly preserved by 
California legislators. See generally Dana V. Kaplan, Women of the West: The Evolution of 
Marital Property Laws in the Southwestern United States and Their Effect on Mexican-
American Women, 26 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 139, 153–54 (2005) (discussing importance of 
retaining civil law community property rules to ensure stability of property rights and 
avoiding political problems associated with depriving women of property vested under 
Mexican law). 
 102 Kleps, supra note 76, at 767. 
 103 In 1863, Governor Leeland Stanford delivered a particularly colorful plea for 
reform, remarking that:  
[c]itizens not versed by constant familiarity with their contents, and desirous 
of investigating the laws, stand aghast as they survey the fourteen ponderous 
tomes that constitute the statutes of this youthful state, and young aspirants 
to professional fame tremble as they cross the threshold that leads into this 
intricate abyss. 
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years, all attempts to revise the early codes were unsuccessful, 
but eventually an agency was created in 1870 to revise and codify 
all of California’s laws.104  Ultimately, a comprehensive code was 
enacted in 1872, and it was hailed as “an example which will be 
speedily followed by all her sister states, adding new laurels to 
the fame which she has already so justly acquired.”105  Thus 
began California’s extended affair with comprehensive 
codification—an affair whose long and tortured history has 
already been chronicled by others in masterful detail.106 
It is important to note that the tension between California’s 
codifications and traditional “common law” ideas has produced a 
unique jurisprudence—one which, in the context of public 
nuisance, creatively accommodates both statutory primacy and 
the common law.  The intersection between statutory and 
common law, which has been decisive in resolving attempts to 
transmute public nuisance principles in other states,107 is even 
more critical in California.  Previously, we have written about 
the great legal “tapestry” that exists in America, woven with 
strands of legislative enactments, administrative regulations, 
and the common law.108  All modern courts construing this 
network of principles are necessarily influenced by their 
interrelationships,109 but no American courts have a longer 
history of working within the tapestry than those of California.  
California was the very first state in America to codify its laws 
comprehensively.110  In California, unlike many other common 
law jurisdictions, codes have always been an essential part of the 
legal system.  As a result, the interaction between California’s 
codes and common law principles has more than historical 
interest.111  Indeed, the dynamic interplay between codified and 
common law is so compelling that “[i]t is difficult, if not 
impossible, to find another topic in American legal history with 
 
Kleps, supra note 76, at 769; see also Parma, supra note 79, at 13. 
 104 See Kleps, supra note 76, at 768–72. 
 105 3 APPENDIX TO JOURNALS OF SENATE AND ASSEMBLY OF THE NINETEEN SESSION OF 
THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 8 (Sacramento, T.A. Springer 1872). 
 106 See generally Aniceto Masferrer, The Passionate Discussion Among Common 
Lawyers About Postbellum American Codification: An Approach to Its Legal 
Argumentation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173, 245–56 (2008); Kleps, supra note 76, at 766; Parma, 
supra note 79, at 12. 
 107 State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 445–47, 455–56 (R.I. 2008). 
 108 Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 952, 1014. 
 109 Id. at 1010–13. 
 110 Masferrer, supra note 106, at 246. 
 111 See Gunther A. Weiss, The Enchantment of Codification in the Common-Law 
World, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 435, 502–06, 511–13 (2000). 
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so many and different implications and consequences for the 
development of American law and jurisprudence.”112 
Although California plainly intended that its early 
codifications should control over common law principles to the 
extent of a conflict, the codes were plagued by uncertainties, 
vagueness, and incompleteness.113  They were severely criticized 
for those conditions, but the Legislature generally failed to revise 
and correct them promptly and adequately.114  For this reason, 
promoters of the codes advocated a compromise between 
statutory primacy and the common law.  The compromise 
suggested that courts could, for the time being, cure the codes’ 
deficiencies by construing them, when possible, consistently with 
common law principles.  As John Norton Pomeroy, one of the 
compromise’s architects,115 stated: 
We thus reach the conclusion that the element of certainty should not 
be attained in a code by a sacrifice of all these other peculiar features 
which belong to the common law; but on the contrary, these 
distinguishing excellencies of the common law should be preserved 
and maintained in connection with the “certainty” which, it is claimed, 
accompanies statutory legislation.116 
Pomeroy, a professor at the University of California Hastings 
College of the Law, was one of the greatest advocates of 
codification,117 and he clearly believed that the common law and 
the codes were compatible.118  He was concerned, however, that 
the authors of California’s Civil Code had not sufficiently defined 
and retained many material aspects of the common law.119  To 
 
 112 Masferrer, supra note 106, at 173.  Although other states may not share 
California’s lengthy history of codifications, most jurisdictions have woven their own 
complex “tapestries” as legislative, executive and judicial branches have become more 
interactive over the past century.  For that reason, the California model may provide 
insights into how the judiciary can maintain the traditional “separation of powers” while 
accommodating the necessary influences of statutory and regulatory law. 
 113 See id. at 247. 
 114 See id.  
 115 Id. at 248–49. 
 116 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, LL.D., THE “CIVIL CODE” IN CALIFORNIA 54 (New York, 
Bar Association Building 1885). 
 117 See David Dudley Field, Codification—Mr. Field’s Answer to Mr. Carter, 24 AM. L. 
REV. 255, 265 (1890) (stating that Pomeroy was one of the “most pronounced advocates of 
the codification of private law, and continued to be so to the end of [his life]”). 
 118 POMEROY, supra note 116, at 52–59 (“All the really able jurists of the highest 
authority in England and in this country, who have advocated the system of codification, 
have expressly recognized and fully admitted this peculiar excellence of our common law.  
They have insisted that the same excellence can be preserved in a code; and that a 
national code, in order to accomplish its beneficial design, should be drawn up by its 
authors, and interpreted by the courts, so as to preserve this distinctive feature of the 
common law, in connection with the element of certainty belonging especially to 
codification.”) (second emphasis added); see also Masferrer, supra note 106, at 249 n.439. 
 119 POMEROY, supra note 116, at 58–59 (“[The Code] does not purport to embody the 
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cure this problem, he proposed that the courts interpret the codes 
consistently with the common law, “regarding the code[s] as 
being declaratory of the common law’s definitions, doctrines and 
rules.”120 
Pomeroy’s compromise therefore incorporated both statutory 
primacy and common law principles as a means to interpret and, 
if necessary, develop and clarify the Code’s provisions.  Clearly, 
in the Code’s incomplete and ambiguous state, courts could not 
regard the text alone as the only authority.121  He therefore 
derived a “fundamental proposition” that provided: 
Except in comparatively few instances where the language is so clear 
and unequivocal as to leave no doubt of an intention to depart from, 
alter, or abrogate the common law rule concerning the subject-matter, 
the courts should avowedly adopt and follow without deviation the 
uniform principle of interpreting all the definitions, statements of 
doctrines, and rules contained in the code in complete conformity with 
the common law definitions, doctrines, and rules, and as to all the 
subordinate effects resulting from such interpretation.122 
In this manner, the power of the Code as a statute 
guaranteeing “certainty” was maintained—together with the 
flexibility of common law courts to construe “new, hitherto 
unused, and ambiguous phraseology” as not intended to change 
existing rules “unless the intent to work such a change was clear 
and unmistakable.”123 Since the new California Code contained 
many departures from the common law,124 Pomeroy’s thesis 
 
entire jurisprudence of the State; it contains only portions of that jurisprudence, and even 
those portions are given in a fragmentary manner.”).  This was a “clear defect” of the 
Code, which required “constant support from the courts.” Masferrer, supra note 106, at 
250 n.444. 
 120 Masferrer, supra note 106, at 250. 
 121 Id. at 252. 
 122 POMEROY, supra note 116, at 51.  This idea was not especially novel or 
revolutionary.  David Dudley Field proposed a comparable interpretative approach for his 
New York codification in 1865. See DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, THE CIVIL CODE OF THE STATE 
OF NEW YORK xix (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 1865) (“[I]f there be an existing rule of 
law omitted from this Code, and not inconsistent with it, that rule will continue to exist in 
the same form in which it now exists . . . and if new cases arise, as they will, which have 
not been foreseen, they may be decided, if decided at all, precisely as they would now be 
decided, that is to say, by analogy to some rule in the Code, or to some rule omitted from 
the Code and therefore still existing, or by the dictates of natural justice.”).  Pomeroy, like 
Field, clearly insisted on statutory primacy whenever the Code’s language required it, and 
deferred to the common law when the Code’s language necessitated it. 
 123 POMEROY, supra note 116, at 50; see also Masferrer, supra note 106, at 252–53. 
 124 Indeed, the Code’s many alterations of common law rules made it a “radical” 
instrument to some observers. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960, at 118 (1992); see also Lewis Grossman, Codification and the 
California Mentality, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 617, 620 n.15 (1994) (“It is important to note that 
there were more than a few departures from the common law in the California Civil Code, 
reflecting substantive innovations contained in the Field Code (which served as the 
Californians’ model) and in previous California statutes and case law.”). 
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elegantly empowered the Code’s new ideas, guaranteed the 
stability of surviving common law principles, and provided 
guidance to courts entrusted with interpreting and applying its 
rules.125  His reasoning proved so persuasive that California 
courts explicitly adopted it in 1888.126  As a result, the 
compromise between statutory primacy and common law was 
formally enshrined in California’s jurisprudence, where it 
remains today as a declaration of democratic priorities and a 
guide for judicial discretion. 
Since 1901, history has demonstrated that California’s codes 
are no less dynamic than the common law itself.  As Kleps so 
aptly observed, “[i]f any rule is to be deduced from California’s 
one hundred years of statutory revision, it is that change is the 
condition of our existence and that a continuous modification of 
our statutes must be expected.”127  Because of this dynamism, 
and because of the state’s historic roots in statutory primacy, 
California’s judiciary is continuously refreshed, informed and 
guided by the people’s representatives regarding codified 
concerns—perhaps more so than the courts of any other state.  
Indeed, as we have seen with recent decisions, the people may 
even instruct them directly by propositions.128 
As a result of these situations, California courts seldom truly 
wear a pure “common law” hat.  Instead, depending on the issue 
and the degree to which it has been clearly stated in the Code, 
courts operate as an integrated part of a collaborative system of 
justice—a system that is “separate” in terms of their exclusive 
power to decide cases and controversies within their jurisdiction, 
but not “distinct” because their “common law” creativity and 
 
 125 “Pomeroy’s reputation as the man who killed the California Civil Code” and as the 
“chief enemy of the California codification movement” is unwarranted, principally because 
his compromise saved Californians from excessively rigid and uninformed applications of 
an otherwise incomplete and dangerously vague codification. Grossman, supra note 124, 
at 619–20 (noting Pomeroy’s reputation as the Code’s “greatest nemesis,” among other 
misleading titles). 
 126 Sharon v. Sharon, 16 P. 345, 350, 354–55 (Cal. 1888); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 5 
(1876) (“The provisions of this Code, so far as they are substantially the same as existing 
statutes or common law, must be construed as continuations thereof, and not as new 
enactments.”). 
 127 Kleps, supra note 76, at 802. 
 128 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008) (holding that 
statutes defining marriage as between a man and a women are unconstitutional), 
abrogated by Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 59, 120, 122 (Cal. 2009) (upholding 
constitutionality of Proposition 8, a ballot initiative adding section 7.5 to article one of the 
California Constitution, providing that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is 
valid or recognized in California”).  Nonetheless, a Federal District Court in San 
Francisco overturned Proposition 8 holding that it violated the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991, 995, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).  This case 
is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
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flexibility is informed and influenced by legislative and 
regulatory provisions, and at times, directed by legislative 
primacy. 
iv.  The Intersection of Statutes and the Common Law 
Although the “common law” may have originated within the 
judiciary, citizens have increasingly imposed legislative and 
regulatory policies to guide and regulate its discretion.  These 
began as early as the Magna Carta, proceeded through the 
industrial revolution, and matured into today’s complex 
legislative and regulatory environment.  In today’s legal 
landscape where conduct and business activities are thoroughly 
regulated by statutes and administrative rules, there are 
comparatively few areas where a “common law” court is free to 
act without legislative influence.129  Over the last century, 
common law and codification systems began to converge.  To a 
greater or lesser extent, codified systems departed from their 
rigidity and became more “fact-specific” in their approaches, and 
common law systems increasingly stressed the advantages and 
importance of “structure, coherence, and predictability” in 
judicial administration.130  Today, scholars recognize that 
societies and economies are so “complex and interrelated” that 
jurists need to draw upon the universe of common law and 
statutory codifications to administer justice effectively.131  
Accordingly, the influence of statutory primacy in California’s 
judicial system may be distinctive, but it would be a mistake to 
presume that it is a completely unique phenomenon. 
In California, statutory priorities were incorporated into the 
very foundations of the state’s legal system, and there literally is 
no point in the state’s history when judicial discretion has been 
governed exclusively by common law traditions.  When the 
legislative and executive branches act to codify or modify 
common law rules by defining expectations, the judiciary cannot 
 
 129 See Arthur T. von Mehren, Some Reflections on Codification and Case Law in the 
Twenty-First Century, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 659, 660 (1998) (“Codification and case law 
embody two contrasting, yet complimentary, principles of justice. . . . In every legal 
system, regardless of where it falls on the spectrum between a pure system of codified law 
and a pure system of case law, the principles of these two approaches are in tension.”). 
 130 Id. at 667. 
 131 Id. at 670 (“The experience of the twentieth century makes clear that, as societies 
and economies become increasingly complex and interrelated, legal orders need to draw 
on both the civil-law and the common-law traditions in thinking about law and its 
administration. . . . The twenty-first century will doubtless witness a continuation of this 
tendency.”); see also Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter 
and the Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 163 
(2007) (“Modern civil law theorists . . . have assumed an increasingly flexible attitude 
toward traditional civil law principles.”). 
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ignore the impact of these statutes and regulations merely 
because the plaintiff’s cause of action originated at “common 
law.”  More so in California than anywhere else in America, the 
common law does not operate in a vacuum, but rather exists 
within a dynamic and interactive democracy that informs, guides 
and, at times, constrains its creativity. 
As early as 1908, Roscoe Pound was convinced that judges 
should take a more responsive attitude toward legislation.132  
Pound demonstrated that antiquated ideas, such as “statutes in 
derogation of the common law are to be construed strictly,” were 
inappropriate, and that courts should refer to the principles set 
forth by legislators when applying the common law.133  As he 
stated: 
Courts are fond of saying that they apply old principles to new 
situations.  But at times they must apply new principles to situations 
both old and new.  The new principles are in legislation.  The old 
principles are in common law.  The former are as much to be respected 
and made effective as the latter—probably more so as our legislation 
improves.134 
Justice Harlan Stone demonstrated the continuity of this 
view in 1936 when he concluded: “I can find in the history and 
principles of the common law no adequate reason for our failure 
to treat a statute much more as we treat a judicial precedent, as 
both a declaration and a source of law, and as a premise for legal 
reasoning.”135 
Since California’s broad codifications in 1850, the 
opportunity to use statutes as a basis for “legal reasoning”—as 
opposed to narrow prescriptive or proscriptive devices—has 
proliferated as a source for adjusting, maintaining, contracting, 
or eliminating rights and obligations at common law.  As we shall 
see below, public nuisance has been a fertile field for exploring 
these ideas.136  Historically, legislative and regulatory 
enactments have been used to inform and guide the judiciary in 
the context of property rights, especially those involving 
expectations that landlords should be responsible for 
maintaining property in a healthy condition.  For example, even 
 
 132 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383–84 (1908) 
(noting with disdain, even at that early date, the “indifference, if not contempt, with 
which [legislation] is regarded by courts and lawyers.”). 
 133 Id. at 387. 
 134 Id. at 406–07. 
 135 Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 13–
14 (1937) (“Apart from its command, the social policy and judgment, expressed in 
legislation by the lawmaking agency which is supreme, would seem to merit that judicial 
recognition which is freely accorded to the like expression in judicial precedent.”). 
 136 See infra Part II. 
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Justice Cardozo stressed the importance of legislative policies, 
such as housing codes.  Although the common law imposed no 
duty to repair, and required tenants to pay rent even when 
housing was unsuitable, the widespread adoption of housing 
codes led courts to discard those principles.  In one of the first 
cases to do so, then-Judge Cardozo held that the Code “changed 
the measure of [the landlord’s] burden,” and used the statute to 
guide and inform his decision regarding whether to reform a 
common law doctrine.137  Other common law developments 
regarding the duties landlords owed to tenants adopted the same 
approach.  For example, in allowing tenants to sue landlords for 
injuries caused by defective premises, Judge Bazelon recognized 
that legislatively established duties reflect contemporary 
community values and that “[t]he law of torts can only be out of 
joint with community standards if it ignores the existence of such 
duties.”138 
When an alleged public nuisance is involved, and there are 
legislative and regulatory policies that define and deal with the 
issue, those policies must be considered before determining who, 
if anyone, is responsible for creating and, ultimately, for abating 
a public nuisance on the owner’s premises.139  Such a decision is 
fundamentally one of public policy, and in the judicial sphere, it 
can only be explained if it can be plausibly derived from policies 
that originate outside the courtroom.  As Justice Linde explained 
in his critical article: “[T]he explanation must identify a public 
source of policy outside the court itself, if the decision is to be 
judicial rather than legislative.  A court may determine some 
facts as well or better than legislators, but it cannot derive public 
policy from a recital of facts.”140  According to Justice Linde: 
 
 137 Altz v. Leiberson, 134 N.E. 703, 703–04 (N.Y. 1922). 
 138 Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 943–46 (D.C. Cir. 1960); see also 
Pines v. Perssion, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412–13 (Wis. 1961) (“[T]he legislature has made a 
policy judgment—that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a 
property owner—which has rendered the old common law rule obsolete.  To follow the old 
rule of no implied warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent 
with the current legislative policy concerning housing standards.”); Boston Hous. Auth. v. 
Hemmingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 840 (Mass. 1973) (“Thus, we are confronted with a 
situation where the legislation’s ‘establishment of policy carries significance beyond the 
particular scope of each of the statutes involved.’” (quoting Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970))). 
 139 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 614–15 (Cal. 1997) (discussing 
legislative efforts to address gang activity); State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 
438–39 (R.I. 2008) (discussing the legislative response to childhood lead poisoning); In re 
Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 491–94 (N.J. 2007) (reviewing legislative efforts to 
address childhood lead poisoning). 
 140 Hans A. Linde, Courts and Torts: “Public Policy” Without Public Politics?, 28 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 821, 852 (1994). 
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Style shapes how a court functions as well as how it is perceived.  The 
decisive difference, to repeat, is that legislation is legitimately 
political and judging is not.  Unless a court can attribute public policy 
to a politically accountable source, it must resolve novel issues of 
liability within a matrix of statutes and tort principles without 
claiming public policy for its own decision.  Only this preserves the 
distinction between the adjudicative and the legislative function.141 
Consistent with this observation, “common law” courts must 
fully and fairly consider the complete “matrix” of the 
jurisdiction’s statutes, regulations and common law principles 
before rendering their judgments.  In such a complex and 
interactive environment, courts cannot appropriately rest their 
decisions solely on “common law” grounds.  Courts are not “free” 
to disregard legislative choices and create their own “common 
law” remedies merely because the Legislature does not expressly 
forbid public nuisance liability in a particular context.  Especially 
in California, where judicial creativity in public nuisance cases is 
restrained by legislative definitions, courts are required to 
evaluate claims within the context of priorities previously 
declared by California’s elected representatives—and to consider 
the extent to which those policies would be impacted by its 
decision.142 
If such an inquiry is made under California law, the search 
should predictably result in judicial deference—not wholesale 
and unilateral “common law” reform.  Such questioning will 
typically expose 
the limits within which courts, lacking the tools of regulation and 
inspection, of taxation and subsidies, and of direct social services, can 
tackle large-scale problems of health care for injured persons, of 
income replacement, of safe housing and products and medical 
practices, of insurance, of employment, and of economic efficiency.143 
If, as Justice Holmes counsels, the development of the 
common law should be “molar [and] molecular,”144 the wholesale 
 
 141 Id. at 855. 
 142 See Harvey S. Perlman, Thoughts on the Role of Legislation in Tort Cases, 36 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 813, 859 (2000) (“If a statute was enacted to protect a class of 
persons from a specified risk, courts should not assume from legislative silence that the 
legislature meant to reject private liability any more than courts should imply a 
legislative intent to create liability.  Such a protective statute calls for formulation of a 
principled response, taking into account the respective roles and competencies of the court 
and the legislature.”). 
 143 See Linde, supra note 140, at 853. 
 144 See S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I 
recognize without hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only 
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”); see also BENJAMIN N. 
CARDOZO, LL.D., THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 113 (1921) (stating that courts 
make law only within the “gaps” and “open spaces of the law”).  Neither Holmes nor 
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transmutation of “public nuisance” concepts to authorize, for 
example, a massive judicially-created, maintained, and controlled 
public health and environmental bureaucracy—answerable only 
to a single judge—requires more rumination and digestion than 
the judiciary alone can prudently provide. 
Moreover, when California’s historical respect for the 
primacy of statutory law in public nuisance cases is considered, 
together with the corresponding deference of the California 
judiciary in such disputes, such a judicially-created bureaucracy 
is neither supplemental nor complimentary.  If created by 
judicial fiat, it would effectively displace and usurp the 
Legislature’s prerogative to define the scope and applicability of 
public nuisance.  In such a situation, the “intersection” between 
statutory and common law, which has been controlled by the 
Legislature, would be equally patrolled by both the Legislature 
and the Judicial Branch—an unpredictable and perilous conflict 
that the founders of California’s legal system wisely intended to 
avoid.  As we will see in detail below, to avert this collision, 
California courts consistently have deferred to the supremacy of 
the Code in deciding the nature, elements, and application of 
public nuisance.  As discussed more fully below, the California 
courts should continue to do so. 
II.  PUBLIC NUISANCE UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW 
A. The Civil Code 
The beginning point for any study of public nuisance in 
California must be the Civil Code.  Between 1850 and 1872, none 
of California’s statutes addressed the issue of public nuisance.  
After 1872, however, public nuisance became a creature of 
statute.  Although California’s first effort in 1872 to codify the 
common law of nuisance lasted only two years,145 the revised 
 
Cardozo can be cited to support deliberate, large-scale reversals of doctrine in the name of 
public policy. 
 145 The California Civil Code of 1872 codified and defined nuisance as follows: 
A nuisance consists in unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, 
which act or omission either: 
1. Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety of 
others; or, 
2. Offends decency; or, 
3. Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or renders 
dangerous for passage, any lake, or navigable river, bay, stream, canal, or 
basin, or any public park, square, street, or highway; or, 
4. In any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the use of 
property. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (Sumner Whitney & Co. 1872) (amended 1874); see also Kelps, 
supra note 76, at 772–73.  Through this language, the California legislature adopted, 
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1874 law remains essentially unchanged.146  Today, California’s 
Civil Code defines a nuisance broadly as: 
Anything which is injurious to health, including, but not limited to, 
the illegal sale of controlled substances, or is indecent or offensive to 
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to 
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or 
unlawfully obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary 
manner, of any navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, 
or any public park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.147 
The Code further states that a nuisance is a public nuisance 
only if it “affects at the same time an entire community or 
neighborhood, or any considerable number of persons, although 
the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals 
may be unequal.”148  It then provides that every nuisance that 
does not qualify as a “public” nuisance is statutorily deemed to be 
a “private” nuisance.149  Both at common law and by statute, a 
public nuisance is also a criminal offense.150  The Code provides 
that “[t]he remedies against a public nuisance are: (1) [a 
criminal] [i]ndictment or information; (2) [a] civil action; or, (3) 
[a]batement.”151 
 
almost verbatim, New York’s Field Code. Jamee Jordan Patterson, California Land Use 
Regulation Post Lucas: The History and Evolution of Nuisance and Public Property Laws 
Portend Little Impact in California, 11 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 175, 188–89 (1993). 
 146 The 1874 Code was amended in 1901, but that amendment was declared 
unconstitutional and void. 1901 Revisions Act, ch. 157, § 366; see also Lewis v. Dunne 66 
P. 478, 482 (Cal. 1901).  It was successfully amended in 1996 to insert the phrase 
“including, but not limited to, the illegal sale of controlled substances.” 1901 Revisions 
Act, ch. 658 (A.B. 2970), § 1 (amended 1996) (emphasis omitted). 
 147 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (Deering 2005).  The 1872 Code was amended in 1874. Am. 
1873–74, ch. 612, § 284. 
 148 CIV. § 3480.  This section of the 1872 code was amended in 1874 to its current 
language.  The common law also distinguishes between private and public nuisances.  The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a public nuisance as “an unreasonable interference 
with a right common to the general public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) 
(1979); see also, Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 962.  The key difference between a public 
and private nuisance claim is whether the “inconvenience,” “damage” or “interference” 
being complained about is harming the public or private individual. Id. 
 149 CIV. § 3481 (“Every nuisance not included in the definition of the last section [CAL. 
CIV. CODE § 3480] is private.”). 
 150 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 607 (Cal. 1997) (noting that “a public 
nuisance is always a criminal offense”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 372 (Deering 2008) 
(stating that it is a misdemeanor to maintain a public nuisance). 
 151 CIV. § 3491.  In civil jurisprudence, these have been the only remedies allowed to 
address a public nuisance in California since 1880.  This section of the Code was enacted 
in 1872 and amended in 1880. See Code Am. 1880, ch. 11, § 1 (adding the remedy of 
information).  An indictment is used to abate the public nuisance and to punish the 
offenders, while an information is used to “redress the grievance by way of injunction.” 
Acuna, 929 P.2d at 603–04 (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1250 (14th 
ed. 1918) (1835–36)).  In criminal matters, anything that “interfere[s] with the . . . 
enjoyment of life or property by an entire community or neighborhood, or by any 
considerable number of persons” may be prosecuted as a public nuisance. PENAL § 370. 
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As can be seen, California’s general public nuisance statute 
retains some of the vagueness that plagued the original common 
law remedy.  It uses terms such as “injurious to health” and 
“indecent or offensive to the senses” and “any considerable 
number of persons” when describing a public nuisance.152  This 
terminology is problematically imprecise—especially for jurists 
and fact-finders.  What exactly do these terms mean?  Just how 
“injurious,” “indecent,” or “offensive” does something have to be 
to be deemed a nuisance?  Just how many people need to be 
affected to be deemed “considerable?”  Without legislative 
clarification, these vague terms seem—at first blush—to be the 
“gaps” and “open spaces” in which Justice Cardozo noted that 
courts make law; thus, delegating substantial discretion to 
judges and juries to find and award relief against persons who 
create a broadly subjective array of offensive conditions.153  In a 
jurisdiction with a different tradition, such a broad statute might 
serve as an invitation and inspiration for judicial creativity, and 
it might also encourage creative attorneys and governmental 
authorities to advocate expansive interpretations and 
applications.154  California jurisprudence, however, took a 
different path. 
Consistent with California’s traditions, the Legislature has 
declared and codified many specific forms of conduct to be public 
nuisances per se,155 thereby illustrating the Legislature’s original 
intent and informing the judiciary regarding how public nuisance 
claims should be defined.  These codified public nuisances 
generally fall into the following broad categories: 
 violating community moral standards;156 
 
 152 CIV. § 3479. 
 153 See Cardozo, supra note 144, at 113. 
 154 But even then, every appellate court that has addressed the issue outside of 
California has refused to accept arguments seeking to creatively expand public nuisance 
as a common law remedy outside of its traditional limits. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, 
Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 455 (R.I. 2008) (agreeing with the New Jersey Supreme Court that if it 
were “to permit these complaints to proceed, [it] would stretch the concept of public 
nuisance far beyond recognition and would create a new and entirely unbounded tort 
antithetical to the meaning and inherent theoretical limitations of the tort of public 
nuisance”). 
 155 An activity is a nuisance per se when a competent legislative body decides to 
exercise its police powers by expressly declaring “a particular object or substance, activity, 
or circumstance, to be a nuisance.” Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
518, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
 156 See, e.g., PENAL § 186.22a(a) (West 1999) (buildings or places used to further 
specified gang activities or criminal conduct are nuisances); PENAL § 11225(a) (operating 
buildings or places used for illegal gambling, lewdness, assignation, or prostitution); 
PENAL § 11305 (gambling ships); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 39561 (West 2008) (allowing weeds to 
grow upon streets, sidewalks, or private property in cities or allowing rubbish, refuse, and 
dirt to accumulate on parkways, sidewalks, or private property in cities); GOV’T § 61002(g) 
(graffiti); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11570 (West 2007) (a “building or place used for 
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 using or maintaining buildings and/or real property in a 
manner that threatens the public health or safety;157 
 possessing or using personal property or improvements in a 
manner that threatens the public health or safety;158 
 polluting the environment;159 
 possessing or using dangerous goods;160 
 businesses unlawfully operating or violating rules and 
regulations;161 and 
 
the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, storing, keeping, manufacturing, or giving 
away any controlled substance” (i.e., drugs)); CAL. VEH. CODE § 22659.5 (West 2000) 
(authorizing local governmental authorities to adopt pilot program-ordinances declaring 
vehicles used to solicit prostitution to be public nuisances). 
 157 See, e.g., PENAL § 11225(b) (operating a bathhouse (i.e., a business that provides 
spa services, “whirlpool, communal bath, sauna, steam bath, mineral bath, mud bath, or 
facilities for swimming”) that allows conduct that can transmit AIDS); CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE § 4171 (West 2001) (conditions that create a fire hazard in building); HEALTH & 
SAFETY § 2002(j) (unnatural property condition that allows mosquitoes or other vectors to 
develop, attract, or find harbor); HEALTH & SAFETY § 17060 (substandard labor camp 
housing); GOV’T § 50485.1 (declaring any structure, tree, or use of land which interferes 
with airspace required to land or takeoff from an airport to be a public nuisance); GOV’T 
§ 50231 (abandoned excavations); CAL. WATER CODE § 8608 (West 1992) (violating 
standards established for maintaining and operating levees, channels, and other flood 
control works); WATER § 8598 (diverting the water from streams in a manner that 
increases the flow of water in the Sacramento or San Joaquin Rivers); WATER § 305 
(uncapped artesian wells); CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 5551 (West 2001) (neglected or 
abandoned crops that pose a menace because of pests, ability to host pests or other 
condition). 
 158 See, e.g., FOOD & AGRIC. § 12642 (produce with excess pesticide residue levels and 
its containers); CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 723 (West 2005) (an encroachment (i.e., 
building, sign, tower, pole pipe, or fence) over or under a public street or highway); 
HEALTH & SAFETY § 4762 (the continued use of cesspools in an area being serviced by a 
sewage treatment system); WATER § 13950-51 (same for Lake Tahoe Basin); PUB. RES. 
§ 4170 (any uncontrolled outdoor fire started without proper precaution to prevent 
spreading). 
 159 See, e.g., WATER §§ 31143.2, 31144.2(a) (violating onsite wastewater disposal 
systems regulations in certain water districts); HEALTH & SAFETY § 5411 (discharging 
sewage or other waste in any manner which creates contamination, pollution or a 
nuisance); HEALTH & SAFETY § 5411 (violating on-site wastewater disposal zone 
regulations); HEALTH & SAFETY § 41700 (allowing detrimental air pollution of any type); 
HEALTH & SAFETY § 116670 (“[a]nything done, maintained, or suffered as a result of 
failure to comply with any primary drinking water standard.”). 
 160 See, e.g., PENAL § 12307 (the possession or use of destructive device (i.e., bombs, 
grenades, explosive missiles, rockets and/or launchers, and weapons of a caliber greater 
than 0.60 caliber)). 
 161 Some examples of this category include: (1) operating certain businesses without 
the appropriate licenses or permits. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25604 (West 
1997) (keeping, maintaining, operating or leasing any premises used to sell alcoholic 
beverages to the public); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5133(c) (West 2010) (a household goods 
carrier operating a motor vehicle to move household goods and personal effects without a 
permit or operating license); PUB. RES. § 3967 (operating a placer mine (i.e., a type of gold 
mine) without a permit); CAL. INS. CODE § 1845 (West 2005) (unauthorized acting as a life 
and disability insurance analyst); (2) packing, storing, delivering for shipment, loading, 
shipping, transporting or selling honey in violation of state provisions. See FOOD & AGRIC. 
§ 29731; see also FOOD & AGRIC. § 26733 (stating that honey found to be a public nuisance 
may be seized, condemned and destroyed); FOOD & AGRIC. § 27601 (stating similar rules 
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 interfering with the use of solar collectors.162 
Generally, making such declarations requires the legislative 
body to “consider[] and balanc[e] . . . a variety of factors.”163  A 
non-exclusive list of some of the factors to weigh in this balancing 
process are: 
 the character of the community, neighborhood or persons 
being impacted; 
 the nature and characteristics of the activity causing the 
alleged nuisance; 
 the distance between the people being impacted and the 
alleged nuisance; 
 the frequency, duration and permanence of the activity 
causing the alleged nuisance; 
 the nature and extent of the injury; 
 the ability to “eliminat[e] or reduc[e] the objectionable aspects 
of the [offending] activity,” short of a complete ban; 
 whether a more suitable location exists to perform the 
activity; 
 the role and “importance of the activity to . . . the 
community”; 
 the amount of money invested in the activity; and 
 the amount of time the activity has been occurring at its 
current location.164 
In addition to these specific declarations, the California 
Legislature granted similar authority to local governments.165  
However, the authority granted to local government authorities 
is not unlimited.  If the state Legislature statutorily allows, or 
 
for eggs deemed to be a public nuisance); FOOD & AGRIC. § 43031 (stating similar rules for 
fruits, nuts, and vegetables); FOOD & AGRIC. § 25556 (same for poultry meat); FOOD & 
AGRIC. § 52511 (same for agricultural or vegetable seeds); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 9007 
(West 1998) (unlawful trapping of finfish and crustaceans); (3) unlawful placement or 
maintenance of advertising on public property. PENAL § 556.3; STS. & HIGH. § 1460(c); 
BUS. & PROF. § 5461 (non-conforming billboards and other advertising); (4) unlawful 
maintenance of a junkyard. STS. & HIGH. §§ 754, 756; and (5) wrongfully placed oil or gas 
wells. PUB. RES. §§ 3600, 3604, 3608. 
 162 PUB. RES. § 25982 (allowing no shrub or tree to grow to where it “cast[s] a shadow 
greater than 10 percent of the [solar] collector absorption area . . . at any one time 
between the hours of 10 a.m. and 2 p.m.”). 
 163 Beck Dev. Co., Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 549 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1996).  
 164 Michael M. Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 631, 638 (1970) 
(citing ROSS D. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 142 (1963)). 
 165  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 25120 (West 2003) (giving counties the right to adopt 
ordinances); GOV’T § 61060 (giving the same right to community service districts); GOV’T 
§ 38771 (giving city legislative bodies the right to declare nuisances); see also Ex parte 
Mathews, 214 P. 981, 982 (Cal. 1923). 
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requires, an act, condition, or circumstance to exist or occur, then 
local authorities cannot declare it to be a public nuisance.166 
B. The Application of Statutory Primacy in Public Nuisance 
Cases 
Although the law of public nuisance is ancient, its use by 
governmental authorities to enforce public policy is a relatively 
recent development.167  As society developed, courts increasingly 
found complexities of the industrial revolution to be “public 
nuisances” that should be abated with injunctive relief.  Not 
surprisingly, courts held that “public and social interests, as well 
as the rights of property, are entitled to the protection of 
equity.”168  What followed was a “continuous expansion” of the 
“public nuisance” definition in the United States—to include 
activities that were not necessarily criminal, and which did not 
necessarily implicate property rights or enjoyment.169 
But this “solution” had its own problems.  As public nuisance 
definitions expanded and as injunctions proliferated in the early 
1900s, authorities warned about problems caused by using public 
nuisance to remedy broad societal problems such as over-
reaching monopolies, restraint of trade activities, prevention of 
criminal acts, and labor controversies such as strikes.170  They 
argued that the main reasons used to justify allowing 
governmental authorities to use public nuisance to enforce public 
policy—its remarkable effectiveness and “that [otherwise] there 
[is] no adequate remedy provided at law”—are inadequate and its 
continued expansion would eventually result in abuses that 
would weaken the judicial system.171 
 
 166 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482 (West 1997) (“Nothing which is done or maintained 
under the express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance.”). 
 167 See People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 475 (Cal. 1941) (citing Edwin S. Mack, The 
Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389, 392 (1903)); see also Henry Schofield, 
Equity Jurisdiction to Abate and Enjoin Illegal Saloons as Public Nuisances, 8 ILL. L. 
REV. 19, 20 (1913). 
 168 Lim, 118 P.2d at 475 (citations omitted). 
 169 Id. (citations omitted). 
 170 See, e.g., Edwin S. Mack, The Revival of Criminal Equity, 16 HARV. L. REV. 389, 
392–93 (1903).  Mr. Mack observed that courts of equity during that time period failed to 
observe their traditional jurisdictional limits because of the ever-expanding boundaries of 
public nuisance law. Id. at 397 (noting that the Supreme Court of Georgia enjoined 
stealing oysters from public beds and the Supreme Court of Texas “sanctioned an 
injunction to prevent the alienation of a wife’s affections”). 
 171 Id. at 400–03.  These same arguments are again resurfacing as governmental 
authorities employ public nuisance litigation to address complex problems such as urban 
violence and public health issues. See supra notes 10–12; see also Faulk & Gray, supra 
note 1, at 974. 
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Not long after this warning was issued, the use of public 
nuisance as a regulatory tool to redress widespread social issues 
waned, and Congress and state Legislatures intervened to create 
the beginnings of a regulated society.  They enacted a vast 
tapestry of statutes, often implemented by regulations issued by 
the Executive Branch, to define minimum societal norms, and 
they created remedies for violations of these standards.  These 
statutes and regulations included declarations that specific 
violations of these standards and norms are deemed public 
nuisances to be enjoined by courts.172  As a result of these 
enactments, the “discretion” of equity courts was both informed 
and curtailed.  Judges were required to consider the range of 
permissible activities and those deemed unreasonable when 
determining the existence of the nuisance and when designing a 
remedy.  These laws meant that courts were no longer free to 
ignore applicable legislative enactments or empowered to create 
their own “flexible judicial remedies.” 
Although California’s traditional reliance on statutory 
primacy provided a bulwark against unrestricted expansion of 
public nuisance, it was not immune from such pressures.173  
Eventually, the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether public nuisance could be expanded beyond statutory 
definitions by the “common law” process.  Noting the amorphous, 
vague, and uncertain nature of the term “nuisance,” the court 
concluded in People v. Lim that “it is a proper function of the 
legislature to define those breaches of public policy which are to 
be considered public nuisances within the control of equity” 
because what society deems to be a nuisance may change over 
time.174  This is particularly true where the activity can be 
remedied by applying criminal law, unless the Legislature 
specifically provides for an equitable remedy.175 
 
 172 See, e.g., supra Part II(A) (listing examples of statutory public nuisances). 
 173 See, e.g., Lim, 118 P.2d at 475. 
 174 Id. at 476 (noting that “[a]ctivity which in one period constitutes a public 
nuisance, such as the sale of liquor or the holding of prize fights, might not be 
objectionable in another”); see also Schur v. City of Santa Monica, 300 P.2d 831, 835 (Cal. 
1956) (“[U]nless the conduct complained of constitutes a nuisance as declared by the 
Legislature, equity will not enjoin it even if it constitutes a crime.”).  In Lim, a prosecutor 
asked the court to enjoin the defendant’s gambling operations.  The prosecutor did not 
allege that gambling fell within the general nuisance statute set forth in section 3479 of 
the California Civil Code, but instead claimed that the court was empowered to look 
outside of California’s nuisance statutes to the common law for its jurisdiction, where 
gambling was historically considered a public nuisance because it encouraged idle and 
dissolute habits. Lim, 118 P.2d at 473–74. 
 175 Id. at 474.  The court stated that it is not impermissible to enjoin criminal activity 
when a clear case is present.  But it was concerned about bypassing a criminal trial, 
thereby depriving the defendant of the protection of the higher standard of proof and 
leaving open the possibility that the defendant remain criminally liable for the same 
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The ideas and principles espoused in Lim are not antiquated 
or outdated.  Indeed, they were affirmed by the California 
Supreme Court in the last major public nuisance opinion it 
issued in 1997,176 where the court once again expressly 
recognized the statutory “supremacy” that has permeated 
California jurisprudence since it was admitted to the Union in 
1850.177  Under these authorities, once the Legislature decides 
the condition or activity is a nuisance, a court cannot usurp the 
legislative power by determining that a violation is 
insignificant.178  Instead, courts are bound to only determine 
“whether a statutory violation in fact exists, and whether the 
statute is constitutionally valid.”179  Courts are not to expand the 
scope of the tort beyond the limits prescribed by the statute, and 
are not to decide for itself that a condition outside the statute’s 
intent constitutes a public nuisance.180 
As a result of these decisions, public nuisance occupies a 
unique place in California tort jurisprudence insofar as statutory 
primacy is concerned.  For other codified tort concepts, such as 
negligence, courts have adopted a more “elastic” attitude.181  As 
Professor Van Alstyne observed: 
[The Codes’] incompleteness, both in scope and detail, have provided 
ample room for judicial development of important new systems of 
rules, frequently built upon Code foundations.  In the field of torts, in 
particular, which the Civil Code touches upon only briefly and 
sporadically, the courts have been free from Code restraint in evolving 
the details of such currently vital rules as those pertaining to last 
clear chance, the right of privacy, res ipsa loquitur, unfair competition, 
and the “impact rule” in personal injury cases.182 
As a result, regarding most torts other than public nuisance, 
the Code was interpreted to not only permit, but also encourage 
appropriate common law development: 
 
activity. Id. at 476. 
 176 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997) (stating that “[t]his 
lawmaking supremacy serves as a brake on any tendency in the courts to enjoin conduct 
and punish it with the contempt power under a standardless notion of what constitutes a 
‘public nuisance’”). 
 177 See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 606 (discussing the role of the Legislature to “declare a 
given act or condition a public nuisance” and the Judiciary’s need to defer to the 
Legislature’s supremacy to declare the law). 
 178 City of Bakersfield v. Miller, 410 P.2d 393, 398 (Cal. 1966). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Lim, 118 P.2d at 476 (citation omitted). 
 181 See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1234–39 (Cal. 1975) (establishing a 
common law system of comparative negligence in California notwithstanding the Code’s 
provision of contributory negligence defense); Englard, supra note 85, at 8. 
 182 ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 36–37 (West 1954). 
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In short, the Civil Code has not, as its critics had predicted, restricted 
the orderly development of the law in its most rapidly changing areas 
along traditional patterns.  That this is true is undoubtedly due in 
large measure to the generality of Code treatment of its subject 
matter, stress being placed upon basic principles rather than a large 
array of narrowly drawn rules.  In addition, the acceptance of 
Professor Pomeroy’s concept of the Civil Code as a continuation of the 
common law created an atmosphere in which Code interpretation 
could more easily partake of common law elasticity.183 
Relying on this reasoning, statutory primacy generally has 
not been afforded significant deference in tort cases outside the 
public nuisance context.  For example, the codification of 
contributory negligence as an “all or nothing” affirmative defense 
did not prevent the California Supreme Court from creating a 
common law system of comparative negligence—even though the 
Code’s provisions regarding negligence actions were entirely 
silent on the subject.184  It is, therefore, important to understand 
why, of all torts, the California Supreme Court has chosen to 
defer to the Code’s “statutory supremacy” in refusing to extend 
the tort of public nuisance. 
C. The Relevance of Concerns Regarding “Standardless” 
Liability 
Although no California court has elaborated on the issue, it 
seems clear that the importance of statutory primacy in public 
nuisance cases arises from California’s aversion to “standardless” 
liability.185  According to the California Supreme Court the 
purpose of the tort of public nuisance is to protect “the public 
interest in tranquility, security, and protection” from 
individuals.186  Citing Montesquieu, John Locke, and James 
Madison, the court recognized that, with respect to public 
nuisances, courts are required to balance and reconcile the 
competing rights of a community’s desire for security and 
protection with individual freedoms.187  Ultimately, the court 
said, a principal use of the law of public nuisance is to maintain 
public order “when the criminal law proves inadequate.”188  It “is 
 
 183 Id. at 37. 
 184 See Li, 532 P.2d at 1232–33. 
 185 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997). 
 186 Id. at 602–03 (discussing the trade off between the public interest and individual 
liberty and noting that “[l]iberty unrestrained is an invitation to anarchy”).  The court 
also said that states “not only [have] a right to ‘maintain a decent society,’” they have an 
obligation to maintain one. Id. (citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964)). 
 187 Id. at 603. 
 188 Id. (citing CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151 (Thomas 
Nugent trans., 1975) (1748); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT §§ 122, 140, 
211, 227 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (1689); JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, 
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a species of catch-all criminal offense, consisting of an 
interference with the rights of the community at large.”189  This 
use is reflected in section 370 of the California Penal Code which 
prohibits any act that is “injurious to health . . . or is indecent, or 
offensive to the senses” which interferes “with the comfortable 
enjoyment of life or property” by “an entire . . . neighborhood or a 
considerable number of persons.”190 
Nevertheless, California’s general public nuisance statute 
seeks to accomplish those ends in extraordinarily vague terms—
terms which, because of their fluidity, could create unpredictable 
liability risks if an unrestrained common law approach is 
applied.  Those risks are exacerbated by the statute’s quasi-
criminal nature, under which many traditional defenses to 
private tort claims do not apply.  For example, the fact that 
others are similarly situated, performing the same or a similar 
activity, or even contributing to create the same nuisance, does 
not preclude a court from enjoining a defendant to abate the 
activity that is contributing to the nuisance.191  Likewise, an 
established custom or practice may, over time, become 
unreasonable by threatening public safety or threatening to 
destroy public rights, thereby creating a public nuisance that 
cannot be lawfully continued.192  When this occurs, the 
 
324–25 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (1788)). 
 189 People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, 705 P.2d 347, 353 (Cal. 1985) (quoting 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 (W. Page Keeton et 
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)). 
 190 Acuna, 929 P.2d at 604 (citing People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 
550 P.2d 600, 608 (Cal. 1976)); In re Englebrecht, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting the similarity between section 370 of the Penal Code and section 3479 of the 
Civil Code) (emphasis added). 
 191 People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1157–58 (Cal. 1884) (stating 
that just because the court could not say that defendant’s operations alone materially 
contribute to the public nuisance does not preclude the court from abating that 
defendant’s contribution to the public nuisance).  It is not a defense to claim “that a great 
many others are committing similar acts of nuisance.  Each and every one is liable to a 
separate action, and to be restrained.” Id. at 1158; see also Patterson, supra note 145, at 
191 (describing the importance of People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co.).  Of course, as 
the lead paint controversy has revealed in other states, merely providing a legal and 
useful product does not justify, “create” or “cause” a public nuisance if the condition to be 
abated is caused by another party’s neglect. See State v. Lead Indus. Ass’n, Inc., 951 A.2d 
428, 449–50 (R.I. 2008) (noting that “although defendants need not control the nuisance 
at all times, they must have, minimally, controlled the nuisance at the time of the 
damage”); City of Bloomington, Ind. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 891 F.2d 611, 614 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (noting the absence of cases “holding manufacturers liable for public or private 
nuisance claims arising from the use of their product subsequent to the point of sale”); In 
re Lead Paint Litig., 924 A.2d 484, 499 (N.J. 2007) (holding that control at the time of the 
damage is a “time-honored element[] of the tort of public nuisance”); see also State ex rel. 
Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Mo. 1980); Town of Hooksett Sch. 
Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F. Supp. 126, 133 (D.C.N.H. 1984). 
 192 Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 777 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) 
(“Mere failure to act—failure to prohibit the acts complained of—is an entirely different 
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traditional defenses of custom, prescription, and statute of 
limitations are not available.193  In this way, the rights of the 
community may take priority over the rights of individuals—but 
they do so in ominous ways that override the significance of 
individual considerations traditionally litigated in private tort 
actions.194 
To avoid this jurisprudential minefield, the California 
Supreme Court wisely chose to defer to statutory primacy: 
[S]ubject to overriding constitutional limitations, the ultimate legal 
authority to declare a given act or condition a public nuisance rests 
with the Legislature; the courts lack power to extend the definition of 
the wrong or to grant equitable relief against conduct not reasonably 
within the ambit of the statutory definition of a public nuisance.  This 
lawmaking supremacy serves as a brake on any tendency in the courts 
to enjoin conduct and punish it with the contempt power under a 
standardless notion of what constitutes a “public nuisance.”195 
Hence, in dealing with these quasi-criminal actions, judges 
are “not wholly free . . . to innovate at pleasure.”196  Indeed, the 
vagueness of California’s general definition of public nuisance 
raises serious questions regarding whether defendants have “fair 
warning” regarding whether their conduct is tortious.197  
Additionally, the indefiniteness of the general public nuisance 
statute—as opposed to the many specific provisions enacted to 
address particular situations—”creates opportunities for 
 
thing from affirmative action authorizing them.  And a failure to prohibit the nuisance 
and impose penalties does not prevent its being a public nuisance.”). 
 193 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3490 (West 2011) (“No lapse of time can legalize a public 
nuisance, amounting to an actual obstruction of public right.”); Eaton v. Klimm, 18 P.2d 
678, 680–81 (Cal. 1933) (noting that where a neighborhood has built up around a 
business, the business must eventually “give way to the rights of the public”); Gold Run 
Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. at 1158–59.  Even the Legislature’s failure to adequately 
regulate or outlaw the custom does not preclude the court from abating the custom as a 
nuisance. Id. at 1159 (noting that “neither state nor federal legislatures could, by silent 
acquiescence, or by attempted legislation, . . . divest the people of the state of their 
[public] right[s] . . . .”); see also Ex parte Taylor, 25 P. 258, 259 (Cal. 1890) (citing Hoadley 
v. San Francisco, 50 Cal. 265 (1875)); North Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. at 787 
(“[A]t common law, no right could be acquired by prescription to commit, or continue, a 
public nuisance.”); Id. at 798 (rejecting the defense of laches because each day the public 
nuisance exists “affords new grounds for equitable relief”); Id. at 800–02 (rejecting the 
defense of custom).   
 194 See Gifford, supra note 15, at 788–89 (discussing the impact of vagueness as 
exacerbated by other tort doctrines forfeiting traditional defenses in public nuisance 
cases, particularly when public authorities are plaintiffs). 
 195 People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997) (emphasis added). 
 196 Cf. Gifford, supra note 15, at 786 (citing CARDOZO, supra note 144, at 141) 
(observing limitations regarding judicial abilities to “create” or “discover” law). 
 197 Cf. id. (citing HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 568–69 (William N. Eskridge & 
Philip P. Frickley eds., 1994)) (discussing general importance of “fair warning” in 
jurisprudence). 
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inconsistent and arbitrary” interpretations—not only by courts, 
but increasingly by “state attorneys general who file recoupment 
actions against mass product manufacturers.”198 
In addition to these jurisprudential concerns, judges 
presiding over a “catch-all criminal offense,” such as public 
nuisance in California, may be constrained, or at least informed 
and influenced, by concerns that the general statute may be 
unconstitutionally vague.  As the United States Supreme Court 
has held: 
Vague laws offend several important values.  First, because we 
assume that a man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful 
conduct, we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act 
accordingly.  Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair 
warning.  Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be 
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply 
them.  A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to 
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and 
subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and 
discriminatory application.199 
Although these vagueness arguments generally apply only in 
criminal proceedings, their fundamental rationale is also 
implicated in public nuisance litigation, where generalities may 
obscure the borders of permissible enforcement.200  These 
concerns are especially applicable when public officials file public 
nuisance claims that target industries in massive recoupment 
actions.201 
As a quasi-criminal tort that deals with “community” 
interests, public nuisance entails problems that, if unrestrained, 
threaten the democratic process.  It is one thing for citizens, 
through their elected legislators, to define and declare that 
specified conduct or conditions are public nuisances before the 
injurious conduct occurs.  It is quite another thing, however, for a 
 
 198 Cf. id. (remarking on difficulties regarding public nuisance litigation generally). 
 199 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972); see also Rubin v. City of 
Santa Monica, 823 F. Supp. 709, 713 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (public nuisance ordinance held 
unconstitutionally vague under Grayned standards); Gifford, supra note 15, at 787 
(quoting and citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)). 
 200 See, e.g., State ex rel. Rear Door Bookstore v. 10th Dist. Ct. of App., 588 N.E.2d 
116, 120–21 (Ohio 1992) (noting that the test for providing “sufficiently definite warning” 
in a public nuisance case as “measured by common understanding and practices . . . is 
particularly applicable in a civil case where the state is granted wider latitude than may 
be applicable in a criminal case”). 
 201 See Gifford, supra note 15, at 787 (“When, however, a state’s attorney general, a 
state official, selects an industry and files a massive legal action seeking recoupment for 
hundreds of millions of dollars against a defendant alleging liability under a particularly 
vague tort, the principles behind the void for vagueness doctrine are implicated.”). 
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single “common law” judge to declare and impose liability for 
public nuisances retrospectively.  When the Legislature acts, the 
“community” has spoken in its most authoritative manner, and 
its enactments necessarily provide “fair notice” to citizens that 
proscribed conduct will result in liability.  When a court rules in 
a private dispute, however, even with the assistance of a jury, the 
scope and scale of democratic guarantees are diminished 
substantially. 
An individual judge is not a comparable substitute for a body 
of elected representatives.  There is no meaningful assurance 
that a court’s creative declaration in a controversy framed solely 
by litigants truly reflects the democratic will of the “community” 
of citizens—a guarantee that is essential for the promulgation of 
quasi-criminal standards, such as public nuisance.  Unlike 
legislation, lawsuits are framed by records generated by private 
litigants, and those records are necessarily limited to disputes 
between the particular parties, not broad community concerns.  
The records of such proceedings are constrained by the parties’ 
resources—reserves typically dwarfed by the collective assets of 
legislative bodies—and courts lack the authority and assets to 
supplement that record with their own inquiries.202 
Unless courts are informed by legislation that defines the 
proscribed conduct, there are serious questions regarding 
whether they can constitutionally or practically assess 
“community” interests sufficiently to declare the existence of an 
unprecedented nuisance, evaluate the causal connections 
necessary to hold particular parties responsible, or implement 
abatement orders requiring the cooperation of absent parties.203  
Moreover, as we have seen, there are serious fairness and notice 
problems associated with imposing quasi-criminal liability for 
conduct that was previously lawful.  As a result, there are 
powerful reasons for “common law” courts to be cautious about 
imposing liability in public nuisance cases in contexts where the 
Legislature has failed to provide adequate definitions of the 
offensive behavior, especially when liability is imposed 
retrospectively.  These concerns fully justify the California 
judiciary’s profound reluctance to base public nuisance liability 
on “standardless” behavior, and they strongly support its 
corresponding deference to statutory primacy in lieu of common 
law creativity. 
 
 202 See Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 1016 n.353. 
 203 In Rhode Island, for example, any abatement order dealing with lead paint 
removal or remediation necessarily would have required the cooperation of property 
owners who were not parties.  Without such cooperation, which could not be 
constitutionally compelled, any abatement order would be ineffective. Id. at 990–92. 
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CONCLUSION 
As this Article has shown, California jurisprudence has 
carefully policed the intersection between the common law and 
the legislative sphere throughout its history, particularly in the 
area of public nuisance.  The tort of public nuisance has an 
extensive track record in California—and that record 
demonstrates an aversion to collective liability under 
“standardless” notions of what constitutes a public nuisance.  The 
California Supreme Court has consistently insisted that public 
nuisances involve specific issues affecting specified properties, 
not generalized concerns affecting more nebulous interests.204 
Consistent with this narrow focus, and in line with the 
State’s legal history, the California Supreme Court made a 
unique commitment to “statutory supremacy” in interpreting and 
applying public nuisance—a decision designed to restrain 
common law discretion in this vague area—not to encourage it.  
Accordingly, before a public nuisance may be declared judicially, 
the impacted properties must be clearly delineated, and the 
proscribed conduct must be defined primarily by legislative 
standards—not solely by common law creativity. 
Even if these principles are not necessarily voiced in every 
public nuisance decision, their deferential spirit should inspire a 
cautious approach.  Expanding public nuisance to encompass 
ordinary claims against product manufacturers, for example, 
displaces a well-defined and manageable tort—strict product 
liability—with a vague and “standardless” cause of action 
constrained only by the imagination of advocates and the 
ingenuity of judges.  Literally any product or any course of 
conduct that allegedly causes some type of “public health 
problem” or “environmental problem” may be labeled as a “public 
nuisance”—irrespective of its original legality—allowing 
attorneys to create mass suits against entire industries.205 
 
 204 See, e.g., People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152, 1155 (Cal. 1884) 
(declaring hydraulic mining a public nuisance, but only in the limited context of a single 
mining operation’s effect on a single river); Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 
18 F. 753, 794–96 (C.C.D. Cal. 1884) (addressing other instances of hydraulic mining 
separately).  Even when the judiciary held that gang activity created a public nuisance, 
the court focused on a discrete neighborhood and the activities being carried out on 
identifiable public streets and sidewalks. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 
614–15 (Cal. 1997). 
 205 “Going to court has become the ‘American Way’ to affect social change.” John Alan 
Cohan, Obesity, Public Policy, and Tort Claims Against Fast-Food Companies, 12 
WIDENER L.J. 103, 130 (2003) (observing that “[t]he goal of social policy torts is to permit 
ordinary people to change corporate practices”); see also John Gray, Cheeseburger Wars: 
No Diet in Courtroom Food Fights, FT. WORTH BUS. PRESS, June 4, 2004, at 37; Jennifer 
L. Pomeranz et al., Innovative Legal Approaches to Address Obesity, 87 MILBANK Q. 185, 
200 (2009) (suggesting that “[t]he sale and vigorous promotion of calorie-dense, nutrient-
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Even in the “limited” context of a controversy involving a 
single product or condition, such as lead paint, the issues extend 
far beyond the courtroom to encompass many sources of harmful 
exposures, especially when the alleged nuisance arose many 
years after the product was sold.206  In most situations involving 
product manufacturers and sellers, especially those regarding 
nuisances allegedly arising from deterioration, it is impossible to 
find meaningful “affirmative acts” by sellers that truly give rise 
to the nuisance.  Regardless of whether “statutory supremacy” is 
voiced by the courts, its spirit is evident in the judiciaries’ 
reluctance to extend liability in these situations. 
Indeed, it is the very vagueness of public nuisance, and the 
inherent lack of standards by which offensive conduct can be 
measured at common law, that motivates the courts to defer to 
statutory guidance.207  Because litigation is framed by the 
pleadings—as opposed to the broader perspective of legislative 
considerations—courts must focus solely on the litigants before 
it, and it can consider only the record generated by those parties.  
When “public” concerns are at issue, courts risk imposing 
liabilities arbitrarily on some persons merely because they are 
joined as parties, while unnamed persons escape responsibility 
solely because the dispute is narrowly framed by the “four 
corners” of the complaint.208  Such scenarios entail the same 
potential abuses that often arise when the judiciary attempts to 
resolve broad societal issues instead of resolving discrete 
disputes.209 
 
poor foods, especially if the promotion is geared toward a vulnerable group such as 
children, when combined with the emerging knowledge of the massive harms associated 
with obesity, can arguably be deemed a nuisance that can and should be controlled by the 
courts”); Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman I), 237 F. Supp. 2d 512, 519–20 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003); Pelman v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman III), 396 F.3d 508, 510 (2d Cir. 2005); Pelman 
v. McDonald’s Corp. (Pelman V), 452 F. Supp. 2d 320, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 206 See Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 994–95.  See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. 
ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2009), appeal filed, No. 09-17490 
(9th Cir. Nov. 5, 2009) (climate change concerns based upon 150 years of greenhouse gas 
emissions); Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. 
Ct. 2527 (2011) (climate change concerns based on greenhouse gas emissions). 
 207 See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 606 (Cal. 1997) (noting that courts 
refuse to grant public nuisance-related injunctions unless they are backed by an act of the 
legislature). 
 208 John S. Gray & Richard O. Faulk, “Negligence in the Air?” Should “Alternative 
Liability” Theories Apply in Lead Paint Litigation?, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 147, 185–88 
(2008) (discussing the problem of defining the appropriate market). 
 209 Id. at 195–97.  In his comments to section 821B, Dean Prosser, the official 
reporter, warned that “[i]f a defendant’s conduct in interfering with a public right does not 
come within one of the traditional categories of the common law crime of public nuisance 
or is not prohibited by a legislative act, the court is acting without an established and 
recognized standard.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. e (1979) (emphasis 
added).  Dean Prosser’s concerns were recently reinforced by one of the reporters for the 
Third Restatement, Professor James A. Henderson, who warned about the “lawlessness” 
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These realities expose: 
the limits within which courts—lacking the tools of regulation and 
inspection, of taxation and subsidies, and of direct social services, can 
tackle large-scale problems of health care for injured persons, of 
income replacement, of safe housing and products and medical 
practices, of insurance, of employment, and of economic efficiency.210 
In contrast, when the Legislature addresses complex societal 
problems, it has the power to consider all the issues and the role 
of all potentially responsible parties before making public policy 
decisions.  The Legislature can make a complete record because, 
unlike courts, it is not bound by the narrow record developed by 
the litigants.  Instead, it is empowered to consider all facts and 
circumstances that contribute to the controversy. 
In our system of government, the responsibility for 
addressing broad societal problems has been entrusted to the 
political branches of government—and the wisdom of that 
decision is especially evident when the resolution may have 
major economic consequences.211  As an institution, the 
Legislature “is far better equipped than the judiciary to ‘amass 
and evaluate the vast amounts of data’ bearing upon . . . complex 
and dynamic [issues].”212  Unlike courts, the political branches 
can consider all pertinent issues in their entirety through either 
hearings or required notice and comment procedures.  As a 
result, political policy choices can strike fairer and more effective 
balances among competing interests, because they can be based 
on broader perspectives and ample information rather than being 
limited to issues raised only by litigants.213  Moreover, in contrast 
to courts, which lose jurisdiction upon rendition of final 
 
of expansive tort liability, including public nuisance litigation. James A. Henderson, Jr., 
The Lawlessness of Aggregative Torts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 329, 330 (2005).  According to 
Professor Henderson, these amorphous tort theories have the potential to be lawless not 
simply because they are non-traditional or court-made, or because the financial stakes are 
high. Id. at 337–38.  “Instead, the lawlessness of [these] aggregative torts inheres in the 
remarkable degree to which they combine sweeping, social-engineering perspectives with 
vague, open-ended legal standards for determining liability and measuring damages.” Id. 
 210 Linde, supra note 140, at 852. 
 211 See Faulk & Gray, supra note 1, at 1016 n.353. 
 212 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 665–66 (1994); 
see also City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440 (2002) (acknowledging 
legislative bodies are “in a better position than the Judiciary to gather and evaluate 
data”). 
 213 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 642–44 (1937) (noting that instead of just 
improvising a judgment when confronted with a national problem, legislatures hold 
hearings to gather “[a] great mass of evidence” considering the problem from many 
perspectives and ultimately “supporting the policy which finds expression in the act”); see 
also Timothy D. Lytton, Lawsuit Against the Gun Industry: A Comparative Institutional 
Analysis, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1247, 1271 (2000). 
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judgment, political branches have continuing authority to revisit 
statutes and rules to modify or tailor their provisions.214 
Under California’s singular principle of “statutory 
supremacy,” public authorities must first demonstrate a 
legislative source for a public nuisance that adequately sets forth 
standards by which the claim is defined and applied.  Hence, 
governmental entities pursuing novel claims previously 
unaddressed by the legislative process are obliged to use the 
political process to ask that the respective legislative body adopt 
their solution.215  Such decisions are fundamentally ones of public 
policy, and in the judicial sphere, they can only be explained if 
they are plausibly derived from policies that originate outside the 
courtroom.216  These extra-judicial sources are an essential part 
of California’s public nuisance jurisprudence.  With them, the 
flow of jurisprudential traffic can be controlled and the 
intersection between the branches of government can be 
traversed without incident.  Without them, innovative appeals to 




 214 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 541 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
 215 Cf. People v. Lim, 118 P.2d 472, 476 (Cal. 1941) (“Such declarations of policy 
should be left for the legislature.”). 
 216 Linde, supra note 140, at 852–54. 
